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I. Introduction
On September 1, 1914, Martha, the last surviving passenger
pigeon, died at the Cincinnati Zoo.1 Martha’s death marked the
end of a species that was once the most populous bird in the
United States, perhaps even the world.2 In the centuries prior,
the passenger pigeon had flown in flocks so thick that “hunting
was easy—even waving a pole at the low-flying birds would kill
some,” and it nested by the thousands, routinely taking over
forests and snapping branches with the weight of their nests.3 In
1857, when a state legislature proposed a bill to protect the
passenger pigeon, a Select Committee of the Senate rejected the
proposal, stating “[t]he passenger pigeon needs no protection.
Wonderfully prolific . . . it is here today and elsewhere tomorrow,
and no ordinary destruction can lessen them, or be missed from
the myriads that are yearly produced.”4
Despite this bold declaration, in less than a hundred years
the passenger pigeon was hunted to extinction.5 “Researchers
have agreed that the bird was hunted out of existence, victimized
by the fallacy that no amount of exploitation could endanger a
creature so abundant.”6 Conservationists and lawmakers at the
turn of the century realized that even the most prolific of birds
could be wiped out by overhunting and exploitation, and a

1. Barry Yeoman, Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, AUDUBON
(May–June
2014),
http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2014/whypassenger-pigeon-went-extinct (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (describing the large numbers of passenger pigeons and the
impact the massive flocks had on society in the 1800s and early 1900s).
3. Id.
4. Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial 1916–2016, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/mbtreaty100/timeline.php (last updated Jan.
26, 2016) (last visited Nov. 25, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
5. Yeoman, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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movement quickly grew to save “interesting species from possible
extinction.”7
This movement culminated in the passing of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).8 In many ways, the MBTA has been a
success—the act stopped the wholesale slaughter of birds and
unregulated hunting of many affected species of birds, allowing
them to recover.9 However, since its passing nearly a century ago,
the MBTA has struggled to keep up with modern developments in
industry.10 Originally designed to combat the evils of
overhunting, the MBTA has not adapted easily to regulating
more modern threats to birds, which include buildings, power
lines, and wind turbines.11 Commentators have criticized the
MBTA as being both under-enforced and over-inclusive, with
courts and regulators disagreeing on how the MBTA can be used
to combat these modern threats.12
7. KURKPATRICK DORSEY, THE DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY 165
(1998).
8. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2006).
9. See Jennifer Howard, Celebrating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Pact
That Transcends Borders, AMER. BIRD CONSERVANCY (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://abcbirds.org/celebrating-the-migratory-bird-treaty-a-pact-thattranscends-borders/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2016) (speaking to the “remarkable”
success of the MBTA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a Solution: Incidental Taking Under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1
(2013) (“The almost century-old Migratory Bird Treaty Act is straining to fulfill
its statutory purpose of protecting migratory birds from the changing and
growing threats of modern industrial society.”); Gloria Dickie, Will the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act Survive in the Modern Era?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/issues/47.18/green-energys-dirty-secret/willthe-migratory-bird-treaty-act-survive-in-the-modern-era (last visited Jan. 7,
2017) (speaking to the serious challenges facing the MBTA following the Fifth
Circuit’s decision that narrowly interpreted the Act) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Migratory Bird Mortality: How Many Human-Caused Threats
Afflict Our Bird Populations, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 2002),
https://www.bakerenergyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2015/09/2002_
FWS-BIRD-MORTALITY-STUDY.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (detailing the
anthropogenic threats to birds that greatly strain the bird populations) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Compare Ogden, supra note 10, at 1 (arguing that the MBTA is
under-enforced and that the Fish and Wildlife Service should take more action
against incidental take offenders), with Benjamin Means, Note, Prohibiting
Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 824 (1998) (arguing that the MBTA should be
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Much of the difficulty in understanding the scope of the
MBTA arises from inconsistent interpretations of one of its main
provisions prohibiting the “taking” of migratory birds.13
Consequently, a circuit court split has developed over whether
the term “taking” includes killings that are incidental to
otherwise lawful activities.14 The Fifth Circuit has issued the
most recent opinion on the issue, in which it interpreted the word
very narrowly in finding that a violation of the MBTA must
involve the “intentional killing” of a known migratory bird.15 In
contrast, the Second Circuit’s interpretation created strict
liability for bird deaths, finding that any killing of a migratory
bird was a violation, whether it was incidental, accidental, or
unintentional.16
One result of the various interpretations of the meaning of
“take” is that the MBTA is inconsistently enforced, leading to
uncertainty over what type of conduct qualifies as an illegal

interpreted narrowly).
13. See generally Migratory Bird Treaty Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratorybird-treaty-act.php (last updated Sept. 16, 2015) (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Maxel Moreland, Migratory Bird Act: What Does Taking Mean?,
UNIV. CIN. L. REV. (Dec. 8, 2015), https://uclawreview.org/2015/12/08/migratorybird-act-what-does-taking-mean/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (describing the split
in interpretations of the word “taking” and arguing that the Fifth Circuit
interpretation of “take” is the more persuasive interpretation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For the purposes of this Note, the terms
“incidental take” and “incidental taking” are used interchangeably. Both are
terms of art derived from the definition of incidental take in the Endangered
Species Act, which is “take that is incidental to, but not the purpose of,
otherwise lawful activity.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539
(1982). This is the definition of incidental take or taking that applies to this
paper.
15. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89 (5th
Cir. 2015) (“[W]e agree with the Eighth and Ninth circuits that a ‘taking’ is
limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds. Our
conclusion is based on the statute’s text, its common law origin, a comparison
with other relevant statutes . . . .”).
16. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978)
(“Imposing strict liability on FMC in this case does not dictate that every death
of a bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability on some party. However,
here the statute does not include as an element of the offense ‘wilfully,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently . . . .’”).

CLIPPING THE WINGS OF INDUSTRY

285

“taking.”17 In turn, this uncertainty has a detrimental affect on
businesses, as many industrial projects necessarily have some
incidental taking while operating.18
In response to this uncertainty, and growing concerns about
how the MBTA is enforced, 19 in 2015, the Department of the
Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) issued a notice
of intent in the Federal Register to prepare a programmatic
environmental impact statement.20 According to the notice, the
departments are considering rulemaking to address the
incidental take of migratory birds, and “to provide legal clarity to
Federal and State agencies, industry, and the public regarding
compliance with the MBTA.”21
While the FWS’s proposed undertaking is commendable,
several problems with the proposal could undermine its purpose.
Significantly, many commentators anticipate that challenges to
the rulemaking will “bring to a head the threshold question of
17. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 11 (“[T]he FWS’s current ‘carrot and stick’
practice of incentivizing compliance with non-regulatory ‘guidelines’ intended to
mitigate incidental taking with vague assurances of prosecutorial discretion
results in an uneven and inconsistent enforcement of the law.”).
18. See Shippen Howe, The Intersection of the Migratory Bird Act and
Energy Companies: An Uncertain Crossroad, VAN NESS FELDMAN LLP (May
2010), http://www.vnf.com/703 (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (“Although the
statute appears largely to be directed at hunters, it has been used to impose
strict, misdemeanor liability on energy companies and has had repercussions on
energy companies that intend to build new infrastructure.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See id. (noting that the increasing number of bird deaths from
industrial activity has prompted the rulemaking, as well as the need to provide
better legal certainty to affected industries); see also Nora Pincus, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service Announces Notice of Intent to Prepare Rulemaking for Migratory
Bird Treaty Act Incidental Take Permits, WELLBURN, SULLIVAN, MECK & TOOLEY
P.C. BLOG (July 9, 2015), http://www.wsmtlaw.com/blog/u-s-fish-and-wildlifeservice-announces-notice-of-intent-to-prepare-rulemaking-for-migratory-birdtreaty-act-incidental-take-permits.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (stating that
the MBTA currently does not have a mechanism for protection from prosecution
for harm caused by common commercial and industrial activities, and the new
proposal could provide some protections to industry) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See generally Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. 30032 (proposed May 26, 2015),
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/05/26/2015-12666/migratory-birdpermits-programmatic-environmental-impact-statement (last visited Mar. 2,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. Id.
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whether the MBTA even applies to incidental take.”22 Indeed,
many argue that the FWS does not have the authority to regulate
incidental taking of migratory birds protected under the MBTA
because incidental taking is not prohibited by the MBTA.23 The
question of whether the MBTA applies to incidental take will
have to be answered if FWS is to move forward with the
rulemaking: FWS can only act pursuant to its congressionally
delegated authority under the statute; if the MBTA does not
cover incidental take, then FWS does not have the authority to
regulate it.24
Following this introduction, Part II of this Note describes the
history of the MBTA and the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, as well as its mechanics.25 Part III details the circuit
split caused by varying judicial interpretations of the Act, the
current regulatory landscape, and the impact of the current legal
landscape on industry.26 Part IV then discusses the 2015 proposal
of the FWS and the problematic nature of the proposal.27 Finally,
Part V of this Note argues for a different solution to resolving the
circuit split: a legislative amendment to the Act clarifying
whether the MBTA covers incidental taking of birds.28

22. Andrew Bell, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Proposes Incidental Take Rule for
Migratory Birds, MARTEN LAW (June 17, 2015), http://www.martenlaw.com/
newsletter/20150617-incidental-take-migratory-birds (last visited Sept. 20,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. See Moreland, supra note 14 (“The original enacting Congress likely
meant to stop humans from purposefully taking these migratory
birds . . . . [T]he 1918 Congress likely meant the traditional common law
meaning of the word ‘take,’ [reinforcing the Fifth Circuit’s holding] that
Congress did not extend the MBTA to include incidental bird deaths.”).
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating that a reviewing court may set aside
an agency action that is made in excess of statutory authority).
25. Infra Part II and accompanying notes.
26. Infra Part III and accompanying notes.
27. Infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
28. Infra Part V and accompanying notes.
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II. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
A. The Birth of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
The extinction of the passenger pigeon was, sadly, just one of
many warnings that conservation laws were needed to save
native bird species.29 Hunting for sport had become a popular
pastime by the turn of the twentieth century, and the “increasing
accessibility of the countryside severely reduced the undisturbed
habitat where animals could hide, and better transportation
allowed hunters to get to even the most remote area.”30 Hunting
magazines “carried articles glorifying unrestrained slaughter” of
migratory birds, and hunters filled railroad cars with dead
pigeons.31 Additionally, in response to the demand for fashionable
feather hats, “the market for birds was dominated by the
enormous demand . . . for feathers by the millinery industry.”32
Overhunting threatened not only birds, but seals, fish, and the
American bison.33
In response to these losses, a conservation movement grew.34
Audubon societies formed as bird lovers became concerned about
the fate of species that were once prevalent throughout the

29. See DORSEY, supra note 7, at 165 (explaining that the conviction “that
wild birds were declining to the point that irreversible danger would occur” was
strengthened by the extinction of the passenger pigeon and the near extinction
of other species).
30. Id. at 172.
31. Id. at 170–71.
32. Kristina Rozan, Detailed Discussion on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
MICH. ST. UNIV. ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2014), https://www.animallaw.info/
article/detailed-discussion-migratory-bird-treaty-act (last visited Nov. 27, 2016)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also DORSEY, supra note
7, at 178–79 (discussing how the fashion trend that began with wearing feather
hats transitioned into wearing entire birds on hats, which drove up the prices of
certain birds, driving several species nearly to extinction).
33. See DORSEY, supra note 7, at 12–14 (detailing how the demise of the
passenger pigeon and the bison provided an impetus for a conservation
movement to protect birds, fish, and seals).
34. See id. at 176–177 (discussing the growth of a bird conservation
movement that grew in reaction to the destruction of many natural species); see
generally Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, supra note 4 (providing a timeline
that notes the emergence of protectionist groups around the turn of the 20th
century).
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United States.35 The Audubon societies lobbied the states for
legislation to restrict hunting, and persuaded ladies to “forgo the
cruelly harvested plumage” that decorated their hats.36 In 1900,
Congress “made a ‘very cautious first step [into] the field of
federal wildlife regulation’” by passing the Lacey Act.37 The Lacey
Act, authorized by the Commerce Clause, made the interstate
transport of wild animals or birds in violation of state law a
federal crime.38 Then in 1913, Congress passed its first national
wildlife conservation law, the Weeks–McLean Act, which declared
“all migratory games and insectivorous birds ‘to be within the
custody and protection of the United States.’”39 Although the Act
was immediately challenged for constitutional deficiencies,40 it
paved the way for more lasting legislation.41
It was against this backdrop that the United States and
Great Britain, on behalf of Canada, negotiated for a treaty to
protect migratory birds.42 Despite heavy opposition, Congress
35. See id. at 179 (describing how Audubon societies grew in strength and
vilified the use of birds on hats); see also Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial,
supra note 4 (speaking to the creation of various Audubon societies across the
United States).
36. Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, supra note 4; see also Rozan,
Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (explaining that the authority of the states to
regulate hunting had been reinforced by the Supreme Court in 1896 when they
held “that the states owned the wild animals within their borders in trust for
their residents . . . .”).
37. Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN &
MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 79 (3d ed.
1997)); see also DORSEY, supra note 7, at 180–81 (“In today’s atmosphere of
pervasive federal environmental laws, the Lacey Act seems frightfully
weak . . . . But by passing it, Congress had agreed that the depredation of
America’s wildlife was not sustainable or acceptable.”).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371–3378 (2012).
39. Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (citing Weeks-McLean Act of
Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828 (superseded by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2006)).
40. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 294–95 (D. Kan. 1915)
(finding that the Weeks Act was not authorized by the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution).
41. See DORSEY, supra note 7, at 188–89 (explaining that the
Weeks-McLean Act opened the door for the MBTA as “Canadian
conservationists saw the passage of Weeks-McLean as an opportunity to work
with Americans to create a mutual scheme to protect birds”).
42. See id. at 192–214 (describing at length the negotiations and
considerations that went into the signing of the Migratory Bird Treaty and
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ratified the Migratory Bird Treaty in 1916, much to the joy of
bird lovers and conservationists. 43 The treaty governs migratory
birds in the United States and Canada, with the intent of “saving
from indiscriminate slaughter and of insuring the preservation of
such migratory birds as are either useful to man or are
harmless . . . .”44 The treaty went on to serve as a model for
similar treaties with Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union.45
B. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
To implement the new accord with Canada, Congress passed
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.46 Under the MBTA it is
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or
kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import,
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or
cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation,
carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg
of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured,
which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such
bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . . 47

asserting that the failure of the Weeks-McLean Act was a driving in the
negotiations).
43. See id. at 206–13 (detailing the problems encountered by the
conservationists when the treaty arrived for ratification in Washington, in
particular from groups in Missouri that would go on to challenge the MBTA).
44. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.–U.K., Aug. 16,
1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
45. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 192
(2009) (providing details of the treaties between Mexico, Japan, and the USSR);
see generally Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game
Mammals, U.S.–Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311; Convention for the Protection
of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment,
U.S.–Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329; Convention Concerning the
Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.–U.S.S.R., Nov.
18, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, supra note 4.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a), 704(a).
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The MBTA has been amended several times since 1918.48
Each time the United States entered into a new migratory bird
treaty with another nation, the Act was updated to include the
species covered by that new treaty.49
The Act is unusual in that it creates a blanket prohibition on
all actions that kill or harm migratory birds and subsequently
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits or
regulations for “hunting, wildlife control, or other measures.”50
Violators of the Act are subject to criminal penalties, which
include fines and imprisonment.51 In 1960, the Act was amended
to create separate misdemeanor and felony crimes.52 While the
felony offenses require the actor to “knowingly” violate the
MBTA, misdemeanor offenses, which are the focus of this article,
are strict liability crimes.53
The criminal structure of the MBTA can be explained by the
desire of its framers “to put an end to the commercial trade in
birds and their feathers that . . . had wreaked havoc on the
populations of many native bird species.”54 The MBTA has been
48. Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service: Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. See The Evolution of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, AUDUBON SOC’Y
(May 22, 2015), http://www.audubon.org/news/the-evolution-migratory-birdtreaty-act (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (providing a timeline of the evolution of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
50. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 45, at 192 (“The Act’s initial prohibition is
as broadly (and redundantly) phrased as the statute’s drafters could make it.”).
51. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 14–15 (explaining how the misdemeanor
and felony violations of the MBTA interact).
52. Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86–732, 74 Stat. 866 (amending the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act to increase the penalties for violation of the Act,); see
also Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (providing an overview of major
amendments to the Act).
53. Ogden, supra note 10, at 14–15. Currently, the only felonies under the
MBTA are the sale or taking with the intent to sell of MBTA-protected species.
Id.
54. Ogden, supra note 10, at 6 (quoting A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of
the United States for Protecting Migratory Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations.php
(last
updated Oct. 17, 2016) (last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review)).
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very successful in combating overhunting and poaching, and is
credited with helping several species recover from near
extinction.55
An example of how the FWS has achieved this success is the
Federal Duck Stamp Program. Under the MBTA, the killing and
hunting of migratory birds is only permitted by the FWS under
certain conditions. One of these conditions is all hunters of
migratory waterfowl must purchase a Federal Duck Stamp prior
to hunting.56 Ninety-eight percent of the proceeds from the
purchase of a Duck Stamp goes to directly to migratory waterfowl
conservation efforts.57 The program has been hugely successful:
“Waterfowl hunting . . . is now generating funds to support
waterfowl population recovery.”58 This is just one example of how
the MBTA, and its related legislation, has been successful in
conserving migratory birds. However, for all its successes, the
MBTA’s construction has led to ambiguity that creates serious
issues in enforcement of the Act against modern threats to
birds.59
1. Construction of the Migratory Bird Act
The MBTA is a broad criminal statute that makes it illegal
for anyone to interfere with protected migratory birds, absent a
permit.60 A species is protected under the Act if it meets one of
the following criteria: (1) the species is covered by the Canadian
Convention of 1916 (as amended in 1996); (2) the species is
55. See id. (“For example, the Snowy Egret, once hunted extensively for its
plumage, has rebounded due to the protections of the MBTA from dangerously
low levels to an estimated current population of over 1.3 million
individuals . . . .”).
56. History of the Federal Duck Stamp, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/get-involved/duck-stamp/history-of-the-federal-duckstamp.php (last updated Feb. 9, 2017) (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. Id.
58. Alexandra Freeman, How Hunters and Artists Helped Save North
America’s Waterfowl, CORNELL LAB BIRD ACAD. (2015), https://academy.allabout
birds.org/duck-stamps/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
59. Infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
60. Supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
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covered by the Mexican Convention of 1936; (3) the species is
listed in the annex of the Japanese Convention of 1972; or (4) the
species is listed in the appendix to the Russian Convention of
1976.61 The list is periodically revised, the most recent change
being made in November 2013 when “when spellings were
corrected, common names and scientific names were updated, and
23 species were added and 4 were removed for a variety of
reasons . . . .”62 The Act only protects native species, specifically
“those that occur as a result of natural biological or ecological
processes.”63
The number of bird species covered by the MBTA is larger
than one might think—it included 1,026 species of birds as of
October 2016.64 Legally speaking, whether a covered species is
actually migratory is irrelevant; a bird is a migratory if FWS
designates it as protected under the Act in a list published in the
Federal Register.65 While the list publication is a challengeable
61. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/
migratory-bird-treaty-act.php (last updated Sept. 16, 2015) (last visited Nov. 27,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20; Rozan, Detailed Discussion,
supra note 32; FWS Revised List of Migratory Birds, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,844
(November 1, 2013).
63. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, supra note 61; see
FREYFOGLE, supra note 45, at 194–95 (describing the legal battle behind the
issue of the MBTA’s application to birds that are present in the United States
only as a result of human efforts); see also Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (considering whether the failure to include the mute swan as a
protected bird under the MBTA was arbitrary and capricious), superseded by
statute, Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809
(2004) as recognized in Pub. Emp. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d
1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
64. Kristina Rozan, Brief Summary of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, MICH.
S T.
UNIV.
ANIMAL
LEGAL
&
HIST.
CTR.
(2014),
https://www.animallaw.info/intro/migratory-bird-treaty-act-mbta (last visited
Nov. 26, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a
complete list of all protected species, see generally Migratory Bird Treaty Act
Protected Species: MBTA as of December 2, 2013, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/management/managed-species/migratory-bird-treatyact-protected-species.php (last updated Oct. 17, 2016) (last visited Nov. 28,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 45, at 192–93 (describing the types of
migratory patterns of the species included in the Act, and declaring that the
migratory pattern has little to do with whether a species is migratory under the
Act).
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agency action, once a species addition goes into effect “a person
accused of violating the Act can not claim that a species was
improperly included.”66
The Secretary of the Interior is vested with the primary
authority to administer and enforce the MBTA.67 The Secretary
then delegates that responsibility to the FWS. The FWS enforces
the MBTA, and promulgates rules and regulations that are
compatible with the conventions.68
The FWS has a great deal of discretion in deciding who to
prosecute, and how, for violations of the MBTA.69 The agency
“relies on the discretion of its in-house law enforcement staff to
select which MBTA violations to pursue.”70 The MBTA has no
private right of action, which is “what gives the selective
enforcement rule its value: if the [FWS] does not enforce then
there be no enforcement of the MBTA.”71 As the harm to birds
becomes more indirect, and thus the culprit more difficult to
ascertain, this discretion over enforcement has grown.72
66. See id. at 192 (describing a case in which a landowner was found guilty
of killing Great Horned Owls that were killing his chickens: “Because the owl
was on the official list, the court refused to consider the claim that the owls were
year-round residents of the region and didn’t actually migrate . . .”).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); see also WILLIAM F. SIGLER, WILDLIFE LAW
ENFORCEMENT 54–56 (3d ed. 1980) (detailing the mechanics of the MBTA and
explaining that the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to administrate the
Act).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 704.
69. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 32 (“The FWS has considerable discretion
in deciding whom and when to prosecute for a violation of the MBTA.”). See
generally Kathy G. Beckett, Migratory Bird Treaty Act Enforcement Questioned,
NAT’L L.R. (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/migratorybird-treaty-act-enforcement-questioned (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. Chris Clarke, Expert: There’s a Problem with Fish and Wildlife’s
Enforcement of Bird Law, KCET (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.kcet.org/redefine
/expert-theres-a-problem-with-fish-and-wildlifes-enforcement-of-bird-law
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. John Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act and Other Laws: The Wind Industry Collides with One of its
Own, the Environmental Protection Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 78 (2007).
72. See id. (“When hunters were the biggest immediate threat to birds,
enforcement of the MBTA was more straightforward: you cite the hunter. With
more of the harm to birds being done inadvertently, enforcement gets more
complex . . . .”); Ogden, supra note 10, at 29 (discussing the FWS’s use of
prosecutorial discretion to enforce the MBTA, and asserting that “prosecutorial
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Commentators are wary of the FWS’s broad prosecutorial
discretion, with many arguing that it is being exercised
unevenly73 and that it is the most significant problem with the
MBTA today.74
2. The Problem with Taking
The word “taking” plays a significant role in the enforcement
of the MBTA.75 According to the MBTA, it is “unlawful at any
time, by any means or in any manner, to . . . take . . . any
migratory bird.”76 It is not clear, however, what “taking” entails,
and “amendments to the MBTA have yet to expressly clarify
which acts the MBTA criminalizes.”77 Unlike the other MBTAprohibited actions, such as hunting or trapping, the word take is
open to interpretation.78 Some argue that taking occurs only in
relation to intentional acts,79 while others argue that the MBTA’s
discretion is the primary incentive” for parties and corporations to cooperate
with FWS regulations).
73. See Brian Palmer, Angry Birds, NAT’L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (June
12, 2015), https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/angry-birds (last visited Oct. 12, 2016)
(“Last year the House Natural Resources Committee accused the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service of selectively targeting oil and gas companies and demanded
that the agency supply records for every prosecution under the law. . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 41–40 (“[T]he FWS’s current MBTA
enforcement policy that relies principally on prosecutorial discretion is
indefensible and unsustainable.”).
75. See Alexander Obrecht, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Question of
Un-Intentional Take Primed for Potential Fifth Circuit en Banc or Supreme
Court Review, BAKER HOSTETLER (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.bakerenergy
blog.com/2015/09/30/migratory-bird-treaty-act-question-of-unintentional-takeprimed-for-potential-fifth-circuit-en-banc-or-supreme-court-review/ (last visited
Feb. 25, 2017) (explaining that the term take is often used in indictments
against companies for MBTA violations) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
77. Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32.
78. See Means, supra note 12, at 826–28 (applying the rules of statutory
construction to determine what actions are prohibited by the word “take” in the
MBTA); Moreland, supra note 14 (describing the various interpretations of the
word “take” and asserting that the term is ambiguous).
79. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir.
2015) (“The MBTA’s ban on ‘takings’ only prohibits intentional acts (not
omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory birds.”);
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ban on the taking of migratory birds applies to non-intentional
actions as well.80 Additionally, this distinction is critical because
the modern threats to birds are not hunting and trapping because
the MBTA was wildly successful in stopping those dangers. Today
the threats to birds are otherwise lawful activities that
unintentionally kill migratory birds, which is known as incidental
taking.81
C. Modern Threats and Modern Industry
The MBTA was devised to combat the overhunting that
decimated bird populations in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.82 What the drafters could not have foreseen, however,
are the threats currently facing the migratory bird populations.
Moreland, supra note 14 (“The Fifth Circuit’s application of imaginative
reconstruction, to explain that the 1918 Congress likely meant the traditional
common law meaning of the word “take,” reinforces its holding that Congress
did not extend the MBTA to include incidental bird deaths.”); see also Means,
supra note 12, at 826 (“Statutory interpretation begins with the language of a
statute and the plain language of the MBTA indicates that Congress meant only
to regulate activity directed at wildlife.”).
80. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (1978) (reasoning
that a person who dumps chemicals should be held strictly liable for any bird
deaths, even if there was no intent to harm birds); Dickie, supra note 10
(“Recent rulings in the 2nd and 10th circuits have taken the view that the law’s
prohibition on “take” applies to any activity that is likely to kill migratory
birds.”).
81. See Thomas Dimond, Fifth Circuit Limits the Scope of “Take”
Prohibition Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Rejecting Second and
Tenth’s Interpretation, ICEMILLER LEGAL COUNS. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.ice
miller.com/ice-on-fire-insights/publications/fifth-circuit-limits-the-scope-of-thetake-prohibi/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (“As the Fifth Circuit observed, properly
limiting the scope of liability under the MBTA is of significant concern to any
commercial enterprise.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Ogden, supra note 10, at 6–7 (“Today, all species of birds are far more likely to
be killed by anthropogenic threats than the estimated fifteen million birds taken
annually by hunters.”); see also Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32
(“There is no question that the need for the protection of migratory birds has not
abated in the last 100 years. But, it is clear that the nature of the threat has
drastically changed.”).
82. See Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (“The MBTA was designed to forestall hunting of migratory birds and the
sale of their parts. The court declines Mahler's invitation to extend the statute
well beyond its language and the Congressional purpose behind its
enactment.”). See generally supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.
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According to the FWS, outside of habitat destruction, the leading
causes of bird mortality are collisions with building windows
(estimated 7 million to 600 million bird deaths per year),
communications towers (6.5 million), high tension transmission
and power lines (8–57 million), electrocutions (900 thousand to
11.6 million), impacts with vehicles (89–340 million), poisoning
(72 million), and wind turbine rotors (140–500 thousand), as well
as death in the hands (paws) of free-ranging domestic or feral
cats (1.4 million–3.7 billion).83 Additionally, “oil field production
‘skim pits’ and wastewater disposal facilities kill 500,000 birds
annually,”84 and large solar panel farms may be responsible for
up to 28,000 deaths annually.85 The difficulty of estimating
mortality rates explains the great ranges in estimates, however,
the FWS has synthesized the most recent studies to provide the
best estimates of avian mortality.86
83. Threats to Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (May 26, 2016),
https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthusiasts/threats-to-birds.php (last visited
Jan. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Scott
R. Loss et al., The Impact of Free-Ranging Domestic Cats on Wildlife in the
United States, NATURE COMM. Jan. 29, 2013, at 1–8 (presenting results of a
study that found birds are more likely to be killed by free-ranging cats than any
other cause).
84. Ogden, supra note 10, at 7.
85. See Eric Zerkel, New Solar Power Plants are Incinerating Birds, THE
WEATHER CHANNEL (Aug. 18, 2014), https://weather.com/science/news/solarplants-birds-20140818 (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (reporting on deaths caused by
birds flying across large solar panel firms and being “fried” mid-flight) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also John Upton, Solar Farms
Threaten Birds, SCI. AM. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/solar-farms-threaten-birds/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) (providing
statistics and details of how solar panel farms threaten birds protected by the
MBTA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Matt Vespa, After
Frying Thousands of Birds, World’s Largest Solar Farm Catches Fire,
TOWNHALL
(May
21,
2012,
2:00
PM),
http://townhall.
com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2016/05/21/icymi-after-frying-thousands-of-birds-worldslargest-solar-farm-catches-fire-n2166718 (last visited on Oct. 12, 2016)
(reporting on the harmful effects of the Ivanpah solar farm on migratory birds)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See Threats to Birds, supra note 83 (providing statistics on the
anthropomorphic threats to migratory birds). For the studies relied upon by the
Fish and Wildlife Service in compiling these statistics, see generally U.S. DEP’T
TRANSP., EVALUATION OF NEW OBSTRUCTION LIGHTING TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE
AVIAN FATALITIES (2012), https://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/pdf/ management/
patterson2012.pdf; J. F Dwyer et al., Predictive Model of Avian Electrocution
Risk on Overhead Powerlines, 28 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 159 (2013); Daniel
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Modern industry clearly has a large impact on migratory
birds, and not surprisingly, the MBTA has an equally large
impact on modern industry. Energy companies are frequently
defendants in MBTA cases.87 Enforcement actions have been
taken against oil and gas producers,88 electric utilities, 89 and
wind energy producers.90 State and local transportation agencies
Klem, Jr. et al., Architectural and Landscape Risks Factors Associated with
Bird-glass Collisions in an Urban Environment, 121 WILSON J. ORNITHOLOGY
126 (2009); Scott R. Loss et al., Bird-building Collision in the United States:
Estimates of Annual Mortality and Species Vulnerability, 116 THE CONDOR:
ORNITHOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 8 (2014); Scott R. Loss et al., Estimation of BirdVehicle Collision Mortality on U.S. Roads, 78 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 763 (2014);
Scott R. Loss, Estimates of Bird Collision Mortality at Wind Facilities in the
Contiguous United States, 168 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 201 (2013); Travis
Longcore et al., An Estimate of Avian Mortality at Communication Towers in the
United
States
and
Canada,
PLOS
ONE
(Apr.
25,
2012),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0034025
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Scott
R. Loss et al., Refining Estimates of Bird Collision and Electrocution Mortality
at Power Lines in the United States, PLOS ONE (July 3, 2014),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone. 0101565 (last
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See Rozan, Detailed Description, supra note 32 (describing typical
plaintiffs and defendants in MBTA cases).
88. See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211
(D.N. Dak. 2012) (finding that and oil and gas producer’s use of reserve pits did
not violate the MBTA because the deaths were unintentional); see also Brian K.
Knox & Barry M. Hartman, New Criminal Charges Under Migratory Bird
Treaty Create More Complexity for Energy Companies, K&L GATES (Sept. 8,
2011),
http://www.klgates.com/new-criminal-charges-under-migratory-birdtreaty-act-09-07-2011/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (reporting that “[t]he United
States Department of Justice recently filed federal criminal charges against
seven oil and gas producers operating in North Dakota’s Williston Basin” for
violations of the MBTA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1075 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding an electrical cooperative liable for killing
birds that were making contact with its electrical poles).
90. See Utility Company Sentenced in Wyoming for Killing Protected Birds
at
Wind
Projects,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(Nov.
22,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/utility-company-sentenced-wyoming-killing-protectedbirds-wind-projects (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (detailing the charges against
Duke Energy Renewables Inc. for killing migratory birds in Wyoming) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John Kell, Duke Energy Pays $1
Million Fine for Killing Birds, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023047917045792145319441567
44 (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (reporting that Duke Energy Renewables Inc. pled
guilty for killing golden eagles and other migratory birds at two of the
company’s wind projects in Wyoming) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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are also susceptible to delays and increased costs associated with
MBTA compliance.91
Despite this, it is not clear how far the MBTA extends over
these industries and activities. As discussed, the word taking is
ambiguous, and these activities all involve incidental take, which
may or may not be covered by the MBTA.92 As modern industry
has developed, concern with the question of the MBTA’s authority
over incidental take has also developed.93 It is in this context that
the circuit courts of the United States have split in their
interpretations of the Act, perhaps muddling the issue further.

Review).
91. See Oklahoma Department of Transportation, Comments from
Oklahoma Department of Transportation (July 27, 2015), https://www.
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0099&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“Compliance with [MBTA] in avoiding
all possible impacts to the common cliff and barn swallows annually costs
taxpayers of Oklahoma up to $15,000,000. Due to Oklahoma’s continued focus
on addressing structurally deficient bridges, future costs attributable to
compliance measures are projected to be as high as $21,500,000 in 2018.”);
Oregon Department of Transportation, Re: Docket No. FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067
(July
27,
2015)
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0121&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
(“Oregon’s
roadsides
bridges and culverts are home to many nesting birds . . . .”); Tiny Hummingbird
Egg Stalls Project to Upgrade a Bay Area Bridge, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-hummingbird-bridge-20170131story.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (reporting about a delay caused to a $92
million bridge repair because of a MBTA-protected hummingbird egg found on
bridge when the work was set to begin) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
92. Supra Part II, subpart D, section 2 and accompanying notes.
93. See Alexander K. Obrecht, Migrating Toward and Incidental Take
Permit Program: Overhauling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Comport with
Modern Industrial Operations, 54 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 107, 108–09 (2014)
(speaking about the expansion of the MBTA through FWS enforcement and the
ensuing confusion over their authority to prosecute incidental take under the
MBTA).
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III. Current Legal Landscape
A. Judicial Interpretations
Given its breadth, it is not surprising that the MBTA has
been called the “most-violated law in the United States.”94
Indeed, applying its provisions literally could lead to absurd
results—such as criminal penalties being imposed on
homeowners when a bird collides with their window.95 “The
MBTA would impose criminal liability on a person for the death
of a bird under circumstances where no criminal liability would
be imposed for even the death of another person.”96 Recognizing
the potential for such absurdity, some circuit courts have been
reluctant to extend the reach of the MBTA to incidental
activities.97 Others, however, have interpreted the MBTA to
include incidental take, relying on the MBTA’s take provision to
hold defendant’s criminally liable.98 This circuit court split is
immediately relevant today, as both the FWS and businesses look

94. Chris Clarke, Nation’s Landmark Bird Protection Law Likely to See
Major Changes, KCET (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.kcet.org/redefine/nationslandmark-bird-protection-law-likely-to-see-major-changes (last visited Feb. 7,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (1978) (“Certainly
construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as deaths
caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or picture
windows in residential buildings into which birds fly, would offend reason and
common sense.”); Andrew W. Minikowski, A Vision or a Waking Dream:
Revising the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Empower Citizens and Address
Modern Threats to Avian Populations, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 152, 154 (2014) (“Some
courts feared that criminal liability under MBTA could reach the point of
absurdity by holding parties liable for bird deaths that were truly beyond their
control.”); Dickie, supra note 10 (“If it applies to human activity regardless of
intent, then where do you draw the line?”).
96. Means, supra note 12, at 832 (quoting Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927
F. Supp. 1559, 1578 (S. D. Ind. 1996)).
97. See Minikowski, supra note 95, at 154 (“[A]s the scope of criminal
liability under MBTA began to increase, so did many of the federal courts’
unease with it.”); Obrecht, supra note 93, at 119–20 (“A recent body of case law,
however, limits the MBTA’s misdemeanor provisions to intentional actions
directed at birds.”).
98. See Minikowski, supra note 95, at 154 (discussing the history of the
circuit split and the early decisions which relied on the take provision to expand
the scope of the MBTA).
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to the decisions of the courts to understand the meaning of the
MBTA.
1. Circuits that Have Extended the Reach of the MTBA
The first judicial expansion of the MBTA came in 1978, when
the Second Circuit held FMC Corporation (FMC) liable for bird
deaths that occurred due to exposure to toxic chemicals.99 FMC, a
pesticide and chemical company, was storing wastewater in a ten
acre pond, which was attractive to migrating waterfowl.100 These
birds began showing up dead, and the state and federal fish and
wildlife services began an investigation.101 Although the water
was treated prior to entering the pond, large concentrations of a
harmful chemical, which could cause “a significant probability of
death” to birds, was found in the pond. Once the investigation
was complete, FMC discovered that the process being used to
treat the chemical was ineffective—the chemical was being
directly pumped into the pond.102 FMC was indicted on thirty-six
counts for “unlawfully by means of toxic and noxious waters
kill[ing] migratory birds included in the terms of the conventions
between [the United States and Great Britain, Mexico and
Japan], all in violation of Title 16, United States code, section
703.”103 The jury convicted FMC on eighteen counts, and fined the
company $100 per count, although the fine was remitted on all
but five counts.104
On appeal, FMC argued that “even if ‘the killing of migratory
birds need not be accompanied by knowledgeable violation of the
law’ (as in the hunter cases), there must be ‘an intent to harm
99. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
100. Id. at 904–05.
101. Id. at 905.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 903.
104. Id. The circuit judges reviewing the decision of the trial court were
apparently “baffled” as to why the jury chose to convict on some, but not all of
the counts. Judge Moore wrote “The 18 counts selected by the jury for conviction
covering the alleged killings . . . and the 18 counts for acquittal . . . present no
clue useful on appellate review unless there were jurors disposed favorably to
the Ringbilled Gull and Shortbilled Dowicher . . . and less favorably to the Least
Sandpiper and the Migratory Fringillid . . . .”). Id.
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birds culminating in their death’ for a conviction.”105 The court
rejected this argument: “[H]ere the statute does not include as an
element of the offense ‘wilfully, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently.’”106 The court found that FMC had “engaged in the
manufacture of a pesticide known to be highly toxic” and then
failed to take measures to prevent this chemical from reaching a
pond where it could come into contact with birds and other
animals, which was enough to impose strict liability on the
company.107
In its analysis, the Second Circuit relied on “the rule of
reason” and an analogy to tort law. In the court’s words; “where
there is no help to be had from legislative history or decisional
authority, as in this specific situation, resort must be had to a
rule of reason or even better, common sense.”108 This guiding
“common sense” principle led the court to reason that extending
the scope of the MBTA to cover every unintentional killing of
birds would not be problematic because “such situations can be
left to the sound discretion of the prosecutors and the courts.”109
The FMC court also analogized the factual scenario to a
principle of tort law to find the corporation liable. Explaining that
the company failed to prevent the toxin from entering the pond,
the court wrote; “Such a situation is analogous to the situations
in the various tort notions of strict liability which have
insinuated themselves into American Law since the English case
of Rylands v. Fletcher.”110 In Rylands v. Fletcher, the English
court found that a person would be prima facie answerable for
damage caused by anything “likely to do mischief” that that
person brought onto their land.111 The court then noted that the
notion of strict liability “has been deemed to apply” in this type of
case (in tort law) and also “when a person engages in
extrahazardous activites.”112 The court reasoned that FMC had
105. Id. at 906 (quoting Appellant’s brief at 11).
106. Id. at 908.
107. Id. at 907.
108. Id. at 905.
109. Id.
110. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
111. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330).
112. Id.
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engaged in the manufacturing of a highly toxic chemical, FMC
failed to protect the chemical from escaping into the pond, where
it then killed birds, and that “this is sufficient to impost strict
liability on FMC.” The Second Circuit’s ruling thus appears to
impose MBTA liability on incidental takings, although the court’s
ruling may be subject to some interpretation.113
The Tenth Circuit joined the Second Circuit’s interpretation
of the MBTA in 2010 when it “firmly established strict liability
under the MBTA, even for unintentional killings.”114 In United
States. V. Apollo Energies, Inc. (Apollo),115 the Tenth Circuit
reviewed the convictions of two oil drilling operators, Apollo
Energies and Dale Walker, who were charged with violating the
MBTA after dead migratory birds were “discovered lodged in a
piece of their oil drilling equipment called a heater-treater.”116
FWS became involved after acting on an anonymous tip and
finding ten protected birds lodged in the heater-treaters.117 FWS
did not immediately pursue action against the drilling
operators.118 Instead, FWS “embarked on a public education
campaign to alert oil producers to the heater-treater problem,”
and gave the oil producers a “grace period” of time to correct the
problem.119 Apollo was one of the oil producers notified directly by
FWS about the problem, but there was no evidence that Walker
was notified.120 When FWS inspected the heater-treaters again
following the grace period, dead migratory birds were found in
both Apollo’s and Walker’s systems.121 Apollo was convicted of one
violation of the MBTA, and Walker was convicted of two
violations.122
On appeal, Apollo and Walker made several arguments.
First, they argued that the MBTA is not a strict liability statute,
and that they lacked the necessary mental state to commit a
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Infra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
Obrecht, supra note 93, at 126.
611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682–83.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id.
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violation.123 Second, they argued that the MBTA is
unconstitutionally vague.124 Lastly, Apollo and Walker argued
that due process requires that they directly cause the bird deaths
in order to be found guilty.125
The Tenth Circuit rejected the appellants’ argument that the
MBTA is not a strict liability statute; “As a matter of statutory
construction, the ‘take’ provision of the Act does not contain a
scienter requirement.”126 In the eyes of the court, the MBTA is
not vague, and does not encourage the arbitrary enforcement of
its provision.127 “The actions criminalized by the MBTA may be
legion, but they are not vague.”128 The court also held that a
“strict liability interpretation of the MBTA for the conduct
charged here satisfies due process concerns only if defendants
proximately caused harm to protected birds,” and that “due
process requires criminal defendants have adequate notice that
their conduct is in violation of the Act.”129
In the opinion, the Tenth Circuit relied on the notion of
proximate cause to cabin the possible absurd results that could
occur by applying strict liability to even incidental take, and the
potential resulting due process concerns.130 The court noted that
[c]entral to all of the Supreme Court’s cases on the due process
constraints on criminal statutes is foreseeability—whether it
is framed as a constitutional constraint on causation and
mental state, or whether it is framed as a presumption in
statutory construction. When the MBTA is stretched to
criminalize predicate acts that could not have been reasonably
foreseen to result in a proscribed effect on birds, the statute
reaches its constitutional breaking point.131

The court ultimately upheld the conviction of Apollo, who had
known of the dangers of the heater-treaters to birds, but failed to

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 688–89.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 689–90.
Id. at 690 (citations omitted).
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take any steps to mitigate the dangers.132 Walker’s conviction was
overturned however, as there was no evidence that he knew of
the danger the heater-treaters posed to migratory birds.133 The
Tenth Circuit was clear, however, that even without the intent,
industrial activity that kills a migratory bird violates the
MBTA.134
2. Circuits that Have Declined to Extend the Reach of the MBTA
Currently, the Eighth, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits have refused
to extend MBTA liability to incidental take. The first of these
decisions is Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans (Seattle Audubon)135,
a Ninth Circuit case from 1991. In Seattle Audubon, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed an appeal from an injunction enjoining timber
sales in spotted owl habitats in national forests in Oregon,
Washington, and Northern California.136 The plaintiffs, an
environmental group, argued that “timber sales which destroy
owl habitat are tantamount to a proscribed ‘taking’ under the
Act.”137 The court did not agree: “Habitat destruction causes
‘harm’ under the [Endangered Species Act] but does not ‘take’
them within the meaning of the MBTA.”138
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on a
classic tool of statutory construction by comparing the text of the
MBTA with the text of the Endangered Species Act;
Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the MBTA,
“take” is defined as to “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect,” or to attempt any such act . . . . Under the
Endangered Species Act enacted in 1973, in contrast, the word
“take” is defined in a broader way to include “harass,” and
“harm,” in addition to the verbs included in the MBTA
definition. The broadest term, “harm,” which is not included in
132. Id. at 691.
133. Id.
134. See id. (discussing the equipment used by oil operators which are
known to kill birds, and finding the deaths of the birds caused by the
heater-treaters violated the MBTA).
135. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 298.
137. Id. at 302.
138. Id. at 303.
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the regulations under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, is
defined by ESA Regulation to include habitat modification or
degradation . . . . We agree with the Seattle district court that
the differences in the proscribed conduct under ESA and the
MBTA are “distinct and purposeful.” The ESA was enacted in
1973. Congress amended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act the
following year, but did not modify its prohibitions to include
“harm.”139

The Ninth Circuit also found that the legislative history of
the statute did not support an expanded reading of the MBTA,
and thus declined to extend the reach of the MBTA to cover
actions that only indirectly lead to bird deaths.140
Not long after Seattle Audubon, the Eighth Circuit came to
the same conclusion in a factually similar case that also involved
a logging operation. In Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S.
Forest Serv. (Newton),141 the Eighth Circuit “considered whether
the Forest Service’s final action approving timber sales, which
was subject to review under the National Forest Management
Act, was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law because the
agency ignored or violated its obligations under the MBTA.”142
The Wildlife Association argued that because the logging under
the timber sale would disrupt nesting birds, killing some (a fact
that the Forest Service did not contest), the sales would violate
the taking provision of the MBTA unless the FWS obtained a
permit.143
The court did not accept this argument. Looking to the
historical context of the MBTA, the court concluded that “[s]trict
liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and
poachers. But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal
prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly
139. Id. at 302–03.
140. Id. at 303.
141. 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
142. Ogden, supra note 10, at 20.
143. Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115
(8th Cir. 1997). The Court also found that the MBTA does not apply to federal
agencies. Id. at 115. This is another contested issue in MBTA enforcement, for
more see generally Robb Wolfson, Note, Birds at a Crossroads: Strategies for
Augmenting the MBTA’s Sway Over Federal Lands, 21 VA ENVTL. L.J. 535
(2003).
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results in the death of migratory birds.” 144 The court agreed with
the Ninth Circuit, and ruled that “the ambiguous terms ‘take’ and
‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort
engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was
undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s
enactment . . . .’”145
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that the scope of
the MBTA does not encompass incidental take. In United States
v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. (Citgo),146 the Fifth Circuit reviewed
Citgo’s conviction under the MBTA for taking migratory birds.
Citgo was convicted for the deaths of migratory birds that had
been caused by open-air oil tanks.147 The district court surveyed
many MBTA cases and “adopted the Tenth Circuit's position and
held it ‘obvious’ that ‘unprotected oil field equipment can take or
kill migratory birds.’”148
The Fifth Circuit was not swayed by the district court’s
interpretation of the statute; “We decline to adopt the broad,
counter-textual reading of the MBTA by these circuits.” To reach
this conclusion, the court looked at the historical context of the
MBTA,149 its common law origin,150 its text,151 and a comparison
with other relevant statutes.152 These canons of statutory
construction convinced the court that the word “take” maintained
its common law meaning in the MBTA: “As applied to wildlife, to
144. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
145. Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir.
1991)).
146. 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
147. Id. at 481–82.
148. Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.
2d 841, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2012)).
149. See id. at 488 (describing the history of the MBTA and its foundational
treaties).
150. See id. at 489–90 (examining the common law definition of the term
“take” and asserting that there is no evidence that Congress meant to deviate
from that definition).
151. See id. at 490–91 (detailing the textual structure of the MBTA and
concluding that nothing in the text points to an expanded meaning of the word
“take” outside of the common law definition).
152. See id. at 489–91 (comparing the text of the MBTA, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act and finding the differences
between the statutes “distinct and purposeful”) (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y
v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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‘take’ is to ‘reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to
human control.’”153
The Fifth Circuit also directly confronted the Second and
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in its decision:
Courts that have read the MBTA broadly, mainly the Second
and Tenth Circuits, disagree with our ultimate conclusion, but
not our analysis of the MBTA’s text. Instead, these courts hold
that because the MBTA imposes strict liability, it must forbid
acts that accidentally or indirectly kill birds . . . . These and
like decisions confuse the mens rea and the actus reus
requirements. Strict liability crimes dispense with the first
requirement; the government need not prove the defendant
had any criminal intent. But a defendant must still commit
the act to be liable. Further, criminal law requires that the
defendant commit the act voluntarily.154

Needless to say, Citgo’s conviction was overturned.155 The
Fifth Circuit explicitly refused to extend the scope of the MBTA
to incidental take.156
B. The District Courts
The federal district courts are also divided on the question of
the scope of the MBTA, further complicating the issue. The
district court for the District of Colorado found that the MBTA
applies to incidental take, following the precedent set by
Apollo.157 The Eastern District of California, which is part of the
Ninth Circuit has also found that the MBTA can be
constitutionally applied to impose criminal penalties on those
who did not intend to kill birds.158 This would seem to be
incongruous with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Seattle Audubon,
153. Id. at 489.
154. Id. at 491–92.
155. Id. at 494.
156. See id. (“Differing with the district court’s conclusions, we hold
that . . . the MBTA’s ban on ‘takings’ only prohibits intentional acts (not
omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory birds.”)
157. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1074) (“[W]hether Moon lake intended to cause the deaths of 17 protected
birds is irrelevant to its prosecution under [the MBTA].”).
158. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D.
Cal. 1978) (discussing the lack of a scienter or intent requirement in the MBTA).
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but the Ninth Circuit distinguished the two factually, as one
concerned poisoning and the other habitat destruction.159
Other district courts that have ruled on the issue, however,
have found that the MBTA does not extend to incidental take.
These include the District of New Mexico,160 the Western District
of Louisiana,161 the Western District of Pennsylvania,162 the
Southern District of Indiana,163 the District of North Dakota,164
and the District of Oregon.165 The MBTA has even been found to
be unconstitutionally vague,166 despite Apollo’s assertion that the
159. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“In Corbin Farm Serv., the district court simply held that the MBTA can
‘constitutionally be applied to impose criminal penalties on those who did not
intend to kill migratory birds.’ The reasoning of those cases is inapposite here.
These cases do not suggest that habitat destruction . . . amounts to
‘taking’ . . . .”) (citing United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536
(E.D. Cal. 1978)).
160. See United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR-05-1516-MV,
2009 WL 8691615, at *7 (D.N.M. 2009) (“The Court concludes that Congress
intended to prohibit only conduct directed towards birds and did not intend to
criminalize negligent acts or omissions that are not directed at birds, but which
incidentally and proximately cause bird deaths.”).
161. See United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., Criminal No. 09-CR-0132,
2009 WL 3645170, at *3 (W.D. La. 2009) (“These regulations were clearly not
intended to apply to commercial ventures where, occasionally, protected species
might be incidentally killed as a result of totally legal and permissible activities,
as happened here.”).
162. See Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 549 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(“As noted in numerous cases, the loss of migratory birds as a result of timber
sales of the type at issue in this case do not constitute a ‘taking’ or ‘killing’
within the meaning of the MBTA.”).
163. See Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1583 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (finding that the prohibitions of the MBTA only apply to activities that
are intended to kill or capture birds or to traffic in their parts).
164. See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211
(D.N. Dak. 2012) (“This Court expressly finds that the use of reserve pits in
commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity that stands
outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”).
165. See Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc., v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp.
1502, 1510 (D. Or. 1991) (“Plaintiffs attempt to expand the MBTA's definition of
a ‘taking’ by reference to the ESA definition of a ‘taking’ . . . . Identical attempts
to expand the definition of a “taking” under the MBTA to include Forest Service
activity have been rejected by at least two other district courts.”).
166. See United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D. Idaho 1989)
(reversing the conviction under the MBTA of a farmer that used pesticides on an
alfalfa crop which were then ingested by migratory birds, killing them, because
the Act was unconstitutionally vague when applied to the facts of the case).
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Act’s terms “are capable of definition” that “ordinary people can
understand.”167
C. Making Sense of the Judicial Landscape
So, what can be gleaned from the varying interpretations of
the MBTA at both the circuit and district court levels?
Unfortunately, the only take away from the decisions is that
there is no well-defined law regarding whether the MBTA applies
to incidental take. Each of the decisions discussed above has been
criticized, applauded, and distinguished, making the law even
more unclear.
While the Second Circuit found FMC liable for the incidental
take of birds, the decision has been criticized for applying tort
principles inappropriately in a criminal prosecution and for being
driven by policy, not by law.168 Additionally, some commentators
have asserted that FMC’s holding applies in only the narrow
factual circumstances of FMC where ultra-hazardous materials
were responsible for the deaths,169 while others have read the
opinion to apply in a broader array of factual scenarios.170

167. United States v. Apollo Industries, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 688 (10th Cir.
2010).
168. See Obrecht, supra note 93, at 123 (“Ultimately, commentators and
other courts criticized the Second Circuit’s application of criminal strict liability
based on tort principles.”).
169. See Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict Criminal
Liability for Non-Hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 DEN. L. REV. 315,
333 (1999) (observing that the Second Circuit relied on the ultra-hazardous
nature of the pesticide manufacture, and that the Circuit may not find
less-hazardous activities that incidentally kill birds hazardous in the future);
Means, supra note 12, at 837 (“Both FMC and Corbin have been distinguished
in subsequent MBTA litigation on the grounds that they constituted an
exception to the normal operation of the MBTA—a gentle way of dispensing
with the quasi-tort principle that finds no support in the law.”); Moreland, supra
note 14 (“The Second Circuit’s opinion is not overly persuasive, and did not
adequately explain why the MBTA should include incidental takings . . . . While
the court explained why the MBTA should include incidental deaths to promote
many important policy concerns, these concerns do not explain why the MBTA
includes incidental deaths.”).
170. See Obrecht, supra note 93, at 123 (“FMC Corp. laid the groundwork as
the first major circuit court decision upholding strict liability for industrial
activities under the MBTA.”).
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Apollo has been heavily criticized for “inserting a mens rea
requirement into a strict liability crime.”171 This judicial
innovation was condemned as the nail in the coffin for strict
liability under the MBTA; “If the MBTA is to maintain its strict
liability standard . . . the reasoning of Apollo Energies simply
cannot be accepted. Its current status as the latest and nearly
exclusive appellate position on the issue renders it particularly
dangerous.”172 Despite these criticisms, “[t]he Apollo Energies
court’s use of notice as a standard for determining what
consequences are reasonably foreseeable has been incorporated in
guidelines for federal prosecution.”173
Criticism has also been levied against the decisions that have
taken a narrow view of the MBTA. Some commentators believe
that the outcomes of Seattle Audubon and Newton are part of an
outdated and “untenable” viewpoint on environmental law,174
while others, including other federal courts, have taken issue
with the distinction the Ninth and Eighth Circuit courts drew
between “direct” and “indirect” action.175 Others interpreted the
holdings of Seattle Audubon and Newton as narrowly focused and
applicable
only
to
circumstances
involving
habitat
176
modification.
Ultimately, the major problems with the case law speaking to
the scope of the MBTA is that it is unclear. Considering this
judicial landscape, how can businesses and industries predict the
legality of their actions when they may conflict with the MBTA,
especially those businesses that may be operating in multiple
jurisdictions?
171. Ogden, supra note 10, at 21.
172. Kalyani Robbins, Paved with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict
Liability under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579, 604 (2012).
173. Ogden, supra note 10, at 19.
174. Id. at 27.
175. See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d. 1070, 1076
(D. Colo. 1999) (“[The Ninth Circuit’s] interpretation of the MBTA is
unpersuasive. Foremost, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ distinction between
and ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ ‘taking’ is illogical. By focusing on whether the taking
is ‘direct’ or ‘indirect,’ the Court conflates the causation element with the actus
reus element.”).
176. See id. at 1076 (“To the extent [Seattle Audubon] holds that the MBTA
does not preclude habitat modification or habitat destruction, it is inapposite
and I express no opinion as to the correctness of that narrow holding.”).
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D. How Can Businesses Cope?
The short answer is that they can’t. It is not clear what the
law is on the MBTA, what is covered by the Act, and how it is
enforced.177 These are significant problems for businesses that
may incur some incidental take.
For established businesses, the uncertainty around the law
can be costly. For example, the MBTA’s misdemeanor penalties
subject “any person, association, or other business entity to a fine
of not more the $15,000, imprisonment not to exceed six months,
or both.”178 In some jurisdictions, the Department of Justice may
impose this fine for each violation, which, in the case of large
industrial operations, can add up a substantial industry-affecting
fine.179 For example, in 2009, Pacificorp, an electric utility,
pleaded guilty to thirty-four misdemeanor violations of the
MBTA.180 The plea cost the company $510,000 in criminal fines,
$900,000 in restitution, and the company was ordered to spend
$9.1 million to repair or replace its equipment to prevent further
avian deaths.181 Although Pacificorp was not using best practices
for mitigating these deaths,182 in another jurisdiction it is
177. See infra notes 195–212 (discussing the use of prosecutorial discretion
to enforce the MBTA); supra notes 99–167 (discussing varying judicial
interpretations of the MBTA).
178. Obrecht, supra note 93, at 119 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012)).
179. See id. (speaking about the authority of the Department of Justice to
impose violations for each violation, or each individual bird killing). But see
United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that multiple bird deaths resulting from a single transaction cannot be
separately charged under the MBTA).
180. Press Release: Utility Giant to Pay Millions for Eagle Protection, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 10, 2009), https://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/pressrel/09-47.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Pacificorp’s wind energy division has since
run afoul of the MBTA, see Utility Company Sentenced in Wyoming for Killing
Protected Birds at Wind Projects, DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/utility-company-sentenced-wyoming-killingprotected-birds-wind-projects-0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (reporting on
Pacificorp’s plea deal for violations of the MBTA at wind farms in Wyoming) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. Id.
182. See id. (explaining that Pacificorp was charged for killing 232 eagles in
about two years and for failing to use readily available measures to mitigate
avian electrocutions at the site).
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possible that in another jurisdiction the company would have
only been liable for only one fine for the single occasion of bird
deaths,183 or may not have been liable at all.184
The cost of criminal prosecution under the MBTA can also be
measured in damage to a company’s reputation. Enforcement
actions against corporations, which violate the MBTA, are often
widely publicized, but the average newsreader will likely not
understand the intricacies of the legal landscape surrounding the
MBTA. Thus, a corporation may find itself in a public relations
nightmare, even if it followed best practices to avoid bird deaths:
“Stigma may nonetheless endure based on factors beyond the
corporation’s control, such as public perceptions of the
wrongdoing and the extent to which corporate values are seen as
the culprit.”185 This reputational harm can damaging and lasting
effects on a corporation.186
Uncertain liability also poses a significant problem for new
industry. The legal ambiguity around the MBTA can be a major
obstacle to developing and creating new infrastructure. This can
be illustrated by looking at the effect of uncertainty on the
development of a wind energy project:
The development of a modern wind project costs tens of
millions, and often hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, the
source of funds and the willingness of banks or holders of
capital to support a project are critical factors in the success of
a modern wind project . . . . For large electrical generating
projects, the limits on rate of return . . . require limited risk
before funding will be released to allow construction. Thus,
183. Some jurisdictions do not allow separate charges for each dead bird, but
rather allow only one charge for all of the bird deaths. See United States v.
Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Meredith B. Lilley
& Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A
Way Forward, 28 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1183 (2008) ([B]ecause only one offending
transaction was involved, only one charge could be brought against [the
violators . . . .”); supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing different
interpretations of how to fine violators).
184. As discussed, there are courts that have refused to extend the MBTA to
cover incidental take. See supra notes 135–156 and accompanying text.
185. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Criminal
Corporate Prosecution, 49 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1265 (2016).
186. See id. at 1264–66 (discussing the ways society reacts to corporate
criminal prosecutions and condoning corporate prosecutions for their deterrent
effect).
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there is low tolerance for uncertainty in wind energy
projects . . . . The uncertainty brought on by unknown avian
impacts, unknown possible consequences to the ability of the
project to operate, and unknown mitigation costs . . . can be an
unbearable burden on project financing. Avian impacts thus
present several distinct challenges to wind energy
developers . . . for instance, pre-project permitting uncertainty
and post-operation risk of reduced operation, shutdown, or
fines for avian impacts.187

For the wind energy industry, this problem is compounded by
the fact that renewable energy is a priority for both the state and
federal governments, which mandated development of this
technology.188 Additionally, these problems are likely to increase
because as the wind and solar energy industries develop, the
number of birds killed by these projects will rise.189 It is likely
that the problem of incidental take will hold back the
development of these industries: “[W]hile [current legislation]
promotes renewable energy . . . older laws, [such as the MBTA],
with outdated value systems, have been left as barriers to
renewable energy.”190 The long view is that this hindrance is
counterproductive because the more significant harms of fossil
fuels on migratory birds will be offset by ostensibly moving to
renewable energy.191
These “older laws” present barriers to the development of
industries outside of the wind sector as well. For example,
Congress has encouraged the development of wireless broadband

187. McKinsey, supra note 71, at 88–89.
188. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 9–10 (speaking about the commitment of
the Obama administration, Congress, and the state governments to increasing
wind energy generation and use of wind energy domestically).
189. See Scott R. Loss, Estimates of Bird Collision Mortality at Wind
Facilities in the Contiguous United States, 168 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 201,
208 (2013) (asserting that bird mortality will continue to grow along with wind
energy development and estimating a mean annual mortality rate of 1.4 million
birds).
190. McKinsey, supra note 71, at 89.
191. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent
to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0114&attachmentNumber
=1&contentType=pdf (arguing that the FWS should “recognize and embrace” the
long term benefit of renewable energy to migratory birds as using more
renewable energy will offset the harmful impact of the fossil fuel industry).
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connection.192 The uncertainty concerning liability under the
MBTA creates significant delay in advancing this directive.193
Energy companies are also hindered if they are required to make
habitat modifications that may affect migratory birds. While
logging does not constitute take, other actions by energy
producers may require significant steps and delays to avoid
prosecution by the FWS.194
The challenges associated with uncertainty are compounded
by the FWS’s wide discretion in enforcing (or not enforcing) the
MBTA.195 As discussed, FWS has very broad discretion in
enforcing the MBTA and largely uses this discretion to encourage
mitigation and compliance with MBTA guidelines.196 While the
Second Circuit was comfortable with prosecutorial discretion
acting as a limitation on the application of the MBTA,197 other
courts have not been uneasy with the range of discretion left to
FWS.198
The first problem with prosecutorial discretion is that it is
unpredictable in multiple ways.199 “[E]nforcement policies might
192. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (1996) (“The
Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over
telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”).
193. See COMMENTS OF THE EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, QUADRENNIAL
ENERGY REVIEW INFRASTRUCTURE SITING PUBLIC MEETING 3 (Aug. 21, 2104),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/08/f18/d_loughery_statement_qer_c
heyenne.pdf (“Inconsistent interpretations for implementing the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act amongst and
within federal agencies add to the difficulty in building new transmission and
maintaining existing facilities.”).
194. See Howe, supra note 18 (“[A]lthough habitat modification is not
expressly a ‘take’ under the MBTA, the FWS has utilized . . . its status as the
MBTA implementing agency to seek to alter the footprint of a large energy
infrastructure project in the environmental review process.”).
195. See McKinsey, supra note 71, at 78 (“The MBTA is mostly
accommodated in the United States by being ignored . . . .’).
196. Supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
197. Supra note 109 and accompanying text.
198. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1085 (D. Colo. 1999) (“[C]ourts should not rely on prosecutorial discretion to
ensure that a statute does not ensnare those beyond its proper confines.”);
Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1582 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (“Such
trust in prosecutorial discretion is not really an answer to the issue of statutory
construction.”).
199. See McKinsey, supra note 71, at 89 (“The uncertainty brought on by
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vary from administration to administration in dramatic ways,
making long-range planning much more difficult.”200 There is the
constant problem of “over-enforcement” and “under-enforcement”
of the Act, depending on the priorities of the current
administration.201 A recent development highlights this problem.
During its final two weeks, the Obama Administration issued a
legal opinion finding that the MBTA prohibits incidental
takings.202 This policy was in place for about a year before it was
reversed by the Trump administration in late 2017.203 Businesses
can not plan for the future when the law is constantly changing,
as is currently the case.
Second, prosecutorial discretion does not help businesses
anticipate how their actions will be evaluated under the MBTA,
and it does not answer the question of what the law actually is.204
An interesting example of this is the history of enforcement
against wind energy projects. The first criminal prosecution
against a wind energy company came in 2013 against Duke
Energy Renewables.205 For years prior to this prosecution,
commentators speculated on whether wind energy projects would
ever be prosecuted under the MBTA, with many believing they
would not be.206 The prosecution was a surprise to the industry
reliance on selective enforcement is perhaps the most difficult risk to precisely
assess.”).
200. Means, supra note 12, at 835.
201. Ogden, supra note 10, at 40.
202. Birds of Regulatory Prey, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/birds-of-regulatory-prey-1514500651 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. Id.
204. See Means, supra note 12, at 836 (discussing the expansion of the
MBTA through prosecutorial discretion and the problems that are caused by
this method of enforcement).
205. Kell, supra note 90. The Duke Energy case exemplifies another aspect
of MBTA enforcements, which is the lack of coordination between executive
actors. Duke Energy was fined for killing golden eagles and pled guilty to the
charge in November, 2013. Id. However, in December 2013, the Obama
administration issued a notice that it would allow wind energy developers to kill
bald and golden eagles without penalty, in an effort to spur wind development.
See Wind Farms that Kill Bald Eagles Are Now Protected From Prosecution,
PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/windfarms-that-kill-bald-eagles-are-now-protected-from-prosecution/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
206. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 183, at 1186–90 (arguing that courts
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and undoubtedly served as warning to others in the industry that
they must take proactive steps to avoid avian take.207 The fact
that the prosecution was such a surprise is telling however; lack
of wind energy prosecutions became accepted as the norm, so
wind energy projects planned accordingly, until the FWS
abruptly changed its policies.208
A third problem with prosecutorial discretion is it creates
suspicion that the MBTA is being enforced selectively, which
has the potential to undermine the willingness of industries to
comply with FWS guidelines and efforts.209 This has been the
concern of several members of congress in recent years,210 and
may have a significant impact on the FWS’s credibility:
will find that the MBTA does not reach wind energy takes).
207. See Arthur L. Haubenstock, Takeaways from the First MBTA Criminal
Prosecution,
LAW
360
(Dec.
10,
2013),
https://www.law360.com/
articles/494437/takeaways-from-the-first-mbta-criminal-prosecution (last visited
Feb. 7, 2017) (“Renewable energy developers should take heed of the clear
message presented by the guidelines and this recent settlement, and take
proactive steps to identify and implement measures that follow the guidelines
and avoid avian take.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
208. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 33 (describing the adverse affects of failing
to prosecute wind energy projects for bird deaths, including the disincentive to
comply with voluntary guidelines because of the lack of a fear of prosecution).
Andrew Ogden argues that this type of policy-making may be a violation of the
National Environmental Policy Act. Ogden, supra note 10, at 38–40.
209. See id. at 37 (“[T]he lack of prosecutions of wind energy developers or
operators creates a strong inference that prosecutorial discretion is being
exercised unevenly to favor wind energy over other activities such as the oil and
gas industry.”); Paul Kerlinger, Does the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Selectively Enforce Bird Laws?, N. AM. WIND POWER (May 2016),
http://nawindpower.com/online/issues/NAW1605/FEAT_02_Does-The-U.S.-FishAnd-Wildlife-Service-Selectively-Enforce-Bird-Laws.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2017) (“[T]he dollars and time spent by the FWS are not proportional to the
damage to birds . . . . The fact that the FWS is spending disproportionately more
time and money focusing on the wind industry strongly suggests that it is
selectively regulating and enforcing the MBTA.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Ogden, supra note 10, at 40 (“The result of such inaction,
allegations, ambiguity, and opacity undermines the FWS’s credibility, and
possibility its legal authority, as the unbiased enforcer of the nation’s wildlife
laws . . . .”).
210. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 37
Republican Senators David Vitter and Lamar Alexander questioned
the FWS’s motivations for prosecuting MBTA cases against oil and
gas producers in a letter to the Attorney General. Senator, and then–
Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, requested that the
House Judiciary Committee investigate how the Obama
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Although these complaints may be more about politics than
plovers, they do raise the valid question of what is the FWS’s
policy that dictates when, where, and against whom will an
enforcement action for an incidental taking under the MBTA
be referred for prosecution? From its own statements, the FWS
has an internal practice that a violator’s adherence to
guidelines and implementation of FWS’s recommendations
will result in a lower likelihood of prosecution. But, the lack of
clear guidelines for many industrial activities, and the failure
to bring enforcement actions against wind energy producers
when FWS guidelines may have been violated, give the
appearance that prosecutorial discretion is being applied
unevenly and with the possible intention of favoring a specific
industry.211

This is a problem because as the pronounced law around the
scope of the MBTA has become muddled through different
interpretations by the courts, the main protection the birds have
from incidental take is the willingness of companies and
industries to work with FWS for best practices.212 If animosity is
brought about through a perception of unequal enforcement, then
industries will be less likely to work with the FWS. This
dimension takes on a new significance given the FWS’s recent
proposal to begin a rulemaking concerning incidental take.
IV. The Proposed Rulemaking
In light of the confusing judicial landscape surrounding the
MBTA, and amid growing concern over how the FWS is enforcing
the Act, FWS has issued a notice of intent to prepare an
environmental impact statement to evaluate the “potential
environmental impacts of a proposal to authorize incidental take
of migratory birds” under the MBTA.213 This notice of intent is
the first step in the administrative process for creating an agency
administration chooses to enforce the MBTA, and then–Presidential
candidate Mitt Romney brought up the subject of selective
enforcement of the MBTA during the 2012 debates.
211. Id. at 37.
212. See id. at 33 (“[I]t is important to emphasize that compliance
with . . . any advice or comments from the FWS regarding a particular project, is
completely voluntary.”).
213. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
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rulemaking. The FWS is required under the National
Environmental Policy Act to undertake an assessment of
environmental effects of a proposed rulemaking prior to making a
final decision.214 Once FWS has evaluated the environmental
impact and reviewed the comments submitted in regards to the
notice of intent, it will likely issue a notice of rulemaking, which
will then be subject to an additional notice-and-comment
period.215 Because the FWS action is in an early stage, it is not
clear what form the proposed rule will take. However, what is
apparent is that the possible rulemaking actions that are
proposed in the notice of intent present a major question about
the authority of the FWS to undertake this kind of rulemaking,
and will not solve the current problems with the MBTA.
A. Proposal
The proposal lists several different possible rulemaking
actions, and invites comments from interested parties, many of
which have been submitted.216 The potential approaches to
enforcement include individual permits, general permits for
certain industries, and memoranda of understanding with federal
agencies.217
The first possible approach that FWS is considering is “to
establish a general conditional authorization for incidental take
by certain hazards to birds associated with particular industry
sectors.”218 This would be subject to the condition that those
sectors adhere to “appropriate” standards to mitigate their
impact on migratory birds, including conservation methods and
technologies that have been developed for this purpose.219 The
hazards and sectors being considered are oil, gas, and wastewater
214. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1975).
215. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
216. For access to all of the comments submitted, see generally Docket
Browser,
REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?
rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=FWS-HQ-MB2014-0067 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
217. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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disposal pits, gas burner pipes, communications towers, and
electric transmission and distribution lines.220 The FWS selected
these hazards and sectors because FWS has a history of working
with those sectors— “they consistently take birds and [the FWS
has] substantial knowledge about measures these industries can
take to prevent or reduce incidental bird deaths.”221
The second approach being considered by FWS is the
issuance of “individual incidental take permits for projects or
activities not covered under the described general, conditional
authorization . . . [or] for which there is limited information
regarding adverse effects.”222 Under this approach, the FWS
would not issue any actual individual permits, but would
establish the authority and standards for the issuance of permits,
and will also consider ways to minimize the administrative
burdens of obtaining other Federal individual incidental take
permits.223
The third option under consideration is “to establish a
procedure for authorizing incidental take by Federal agencies
that commit in a memorandum of understanding with [FWS] to
consider impacts to migratory birds in their actions and to
mitigate that take appropriately.”224
The fourth possible approach would be the “development of
voluntary guidance for industry sectors.”225 Under this approach,
FWS “would continue to work closely with interested industry
sectors to assess the extent that their their operations and
facilities may pose hazards to migratory birds” and to evaluate
mitigation guidelines.226 This approach would not provide legal
authorization for incidental take but FWS would, as a matter of
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. This proposed regulation is not pertinent for this article as it deals
with federal agencies and not private parties. However, it is worth noting that
there is a divide on whether the MBTA even applies to federal agencies, making
this a problematic proposal in terms of FWS authority. See generally Robb
Wolfson, Note, Birds at a Crossroads: Strategies for Augmenting the MBTA’s
Sway Over Federal Lands, 21 VA ENVTL. L. J. 535 (2003).
225. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
226. Id.
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discretion, “consider the extent to which a company or individual
had complied with that guidance as a substantial factor in
assessing any potential enforcement action for violation of the
Act.”227
B. The Proposed Rulemaking’s Shortcomings
Assuming that the FWS ultimately finds the authority to
regulate incidental taking, the proposed rules leave several
problems unresolved that will undermine the purpose of the
rulemaking.228 As discussed, the current problems with the
MBTA and its myriad of interpretations are that the law is
uncertain which leads to inconsistent (and possibly unequal)
enforcement, it hinders development of new industry, and it is
extremely costly and unpredictable.229 These are problems that
need to be resolved, but the FWS’s proposed rulemaking will not
solve them.
As a preliminary matter, the proposed “development of
voluntary guidance for industry sectors” approach is the current
state of MBTA enforcement. The MBTA is enforced via
prosecutorial discretion, and the FWS has announced that it
takes into account voluntary compliance with FWS guidelines
when pursuing violations.230 This suggested approach, therefore,
is not a solution to the problems currently being created by
uncertainty around the scope of the MBTA.
The remaining proposed permitting options, the general
authorization, and the individual permits, also do not solve the
problems associated with the legal uncertainty surrounding the
MBTA. First, each of these potential permitting programs would
227. Id.
228. See Bell, supra note 22 (speaking to the practical restraints of the
proposed permitting programs, as well as their possible shortcomings); Juan
Carlos Rodriguez, FWS Migratory Bird Permits Could Benefit Industry, Wildlife,
LAW 360 (June 26, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/672441/fws-migratorybird-permits-could-benefit-industry-wildlife (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (reporting
on what questions have been left unanswered by the FWS proposal, and what
the possible problems these questions may cause for the proposal) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
229. Supra notes 178–212 and accompanying text.
230. Supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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be unpredictable, much as enforcement is now.231 Second, the
proposed programs have the potential to hinder development in
the affected industries.232 Third, the permitting options would
continue to rely heavily on prosecutorial discretion, and perhaps
exacerbate the problems that are already associated with this
discretion.233 Finally, and most significantly, the FWS may not
have the authority under the MBTA to enforce a permitting
program for incidental take, as the MBTA may not cover
incidental take.234
1. Unpredictablity
According to the notice of intent, the general authorization
and individual permits would be optional for those that are
hoping to comply with the MBTA.235 Such a lack of mandate
leaves open questions as to how the government will apply its
enforcement provisions to projects that have incidental taking,
but do not have a permit.236 This uncertainty is similar to the
uncertainty currently facing the industry—a great deal of
discretion is left to FWS to determine who to prosecute which
makes it very difficult for industrial planners to know what to do
to avoid prosecution. Additionally, the notice makes it clear that
FWS’s position is that the MBTA covers every unpermitted
migratory bird death,237 although several courts have found
otherwise.238 Even with these permitting programs in place,
industries would be subject to different liabilities depending on
where they are located—in a jurisdiction where incidental take is
covered by the MBTA, or in a jurisdiction where it is not.
Presumably, those industries located in a jurisdiction where the
MBTA has not been found to include incidental take would not
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
note 20.
237.
238.

Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 1.
Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 2.
Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 3.
Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 4.
Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
Rodriguez, supra note 228; see generally Migratory Bird Permits, supra
Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
Supra notes 135–176 and accompanying text.
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need a permit, but what of the many industries with operations
and a presence in multiple jurisdictions? Some companies will
find that the costs of the permitting programs will not be worth
it, and thus some industries may continue with relying on the
current status quo assume the risks associated with the current
framework of enforcement.239
These proposals also include the possibility of compensatory
mitigation.240 Again, this would create similar problems to what
the industry is facing currently; without strict guidelines as to
when and what amounts of payments are expected, the
enforcement may continue to be arbitrary because of the
discretion left to FWS in choosing how to enforce the rule.241 If
the permit system “becomes a methodology for the service to get a
lot of compensatory mitigation where it otherwise wouldn’t have
been able to request it or impose it, then the industry will
probably push back and say this is so burdensome it’s really not
worth it.”242 Additionally, wind and solar industries are currently
not under consideration for the general authorization, which will
do nothing to bring legal certainty to these industries as they
continue to grow in size and importance to the national and
global economies.243
239. See Rodriguez, supra note 228 (“If the project developer decides that a
permit is not necessary or cost-effective, for example, the service should address
whether that increases the risk of prosecution under the MBTA is there is a
take of migratory birds . . . .”).
240. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
241. See Gerald George, Migratory Bird Treaty Act Narrowly Interpreted:
The Fifth Circuit Joins the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. BLOG
(Sept.
10,
2015),
http://www.energyenvironmentallaw.com/2015/09/10/
migratory-bird-treaty-act-narrowly-interpreted-the-fifth-circuit-joins-the-eighthand-ninth-circuits/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (speaking to the FWS’s wide
discretion in enforcing the MBTA, and how the Fifth Circuit refused to extend
the meaning to give the Act a broad meaning in light of that wide discretion) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
242. Rodriguez, supra note 236.
243. See Scott R. Loss, Estimates of Bird Collision Mortality at Wind
Facilities in the Contiguous United States, 168 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 201,
202 (2013) (speaking to the growing reliance on and investment in wind energy
and asserting that the impact of the wind energy development is expected to
grow in light of both federal and state incentives for investment in the industry);
Rodriguez, supra note 236 (“Notably absent from the sectors under
consideration for a general permit program are the growing renewable energy
sources of wind and solar power . . . .”); see generally Migratory Bird Permits,
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2. Hindrance of Development
Each of the proposed rulemaking paths would likely hinder
development in the affected industries. Most obviously, the
permit programs and the mitigation requirements have the
potential to be quite costly to both existing industry facilities
and those looking to develop.244 The costs associated with the
permitting program may effectively undermine key federal
and state policies to encourage the development of certain
industries, such as broadband wireless245 and wind energy.246

supra note 20.
244. See Rodriguez, supra note 236 (discussing the necessity of a
“grandfathering mechanism” to prevent the unfair, costly, and inefficient result
of requiring projects that are already complying with the FWS voluntary
guidelines to apply for new permits); see also NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments
on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29,
2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB2014-0067-0114&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
(“[T]he
program
should not be retroactive. Requiring existing facilities that are not causing
significant impacts to bird populations to install additional equipment or take
action at considerable cost in order to retrofit equipment would be an inefficient
use of time and resources.”).
245. See National Association of Broadcasters, Comments of the National
Association of Broadcasters (July 27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0084&attachment
Number=1&contentType=pdf (“Imposing new tower siting hurdles on the
deployment of broadcast and wireless infrastructure at this time will hinder the
post-incentive auction transition, frustrate federal spectrum policy, and delay
the offering of new mobile broadband services, contrary to congressional
intent.”); PCIA—The Wireless Infrastructure Association, In the Matter of
Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (July
27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/ contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQMB-2014-00670112&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
Rather than expedite wireless broadband deployment and
availability, the [programmatic environmental impact statement]
approach would only produce further delay . . . . These new
obligations would slow broadband deployment and would increase the
costs associated with deployment, which ultimately would discourage
that investment.
246. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent
to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 2015), https://www.
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0114&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[Next Era Energy] believes the FWS
should recognize, as the President’s Climate Change Plan recognizes, the
importance of expanding wind and solar renewable energy . . . . If designed
improperly, the proposed MBTA rule . . . would be a deterrent to the desired
growth of renewable energy.”).
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Several of the comments to the notice of intent raise the
question of whether these permitting programs are even
feasible, given the limited resources of FWS.247 The limited
resources of FWS pose a problem to development because
delays caused by waiting for a permit can be costly, and
possibly fatal, to new projects.248 Delays, burdensome review
processes, and inconsistent administration may also cause
fewer industry actors to apply for permits, as the risk of
operating without one will simply outweigh the cost of trying
to obtain a permit.249

247. See American Electric Power, Re: Comments Regarding the May 26,
2015 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement to Evaluate the Potential Environmental Impacts of a Proposal to
Authorize Incidental Take of Migratory Birds (July 24, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0043&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“AEP has concerns that
the agency does not have the resources to manage another permit program.”);
American Wind Energy Association, Re: Comments regarding the May 26, 2015
Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to
Evaluate the Potential Environmental Impacts of a Proposal to Authorize
Incidental
Take
of
Migratory
Birds
(July
27,
2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0139&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[W]e remain skeptical of
the Service’s ability to fashion a permit process that is sufficiently streamlined
as to be workable for the regulated community. The Service simply does not
have the resources to effectively implement a permitting program . . . .”).
248. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent
to
Prepare
Migratory
Bird
Permit
(July
29,
2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0114&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf.
Our experience with FWS permitting has been that despite the best
of intentions, FWS permit programs results in significant delays to
the advancement of effected projects. For example, the existing
Special Purpose Utility Salvage permit . . . is a relatively
straightforward voluntary permit that has now become unusable by
industry due to unacceptable delays. It has been the experience of the
wind industry that the salvage permit application, review, and
approval process has been unnecessarily bloated by requiring
multiple reviews by understaffed field offices, with no clear review
deadline or issuance timeline.
249. See American Wind Energy Association, Re: Comments regarding the
May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement to Evaluate the Potential Environmental Impacts of a
Proposal to Authorize Incidental Take of Migratory Birds (July 27, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0139&attachment Number=1&contentType=pdf.
The Service arguably has a poor track record of implementing new (or
existing) permit programs, which are much less ambitious in the
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3. Prosecutorial Discretion
The proposed permitting programs would continue to rely in
large part on prosecutorial discretion. This is problematic because
the FWS’s prosecutorial discretion is currently contributing to the
problem of legal uncertainty around the MBTA, so continued
reliance on that discretion is not an appropriate way to resolve
that uncertainty.
The FWS intends to focus on “sectors whose impacts on
migratory birds is well known and where practical avoidance
measures are possible.”250 As is evident by FWS’s incredible
ranges of estimated bird deaths,251 there is no clear consensus on
what impact various industries or hazards have on avian
populations. Certainly there is some evidence that some
industries have more of an impact than others, but creating a
permitting program based on such nebulous estimations could
easily be seen as arbitrary and capricious.252 FWS will ostensibly
scope of their coverage. The wind industry is fully aware of how costly
and lengthy the incidental take permit process has become under the
ESA, despite more than three decades of permitting experience. More
recently, in the preambles to both the proposed and final rules
establishing the programmatic take permit program under BGEPA,
the Service asserted that the permit process would not be
burdensome for permit applicants. Yet, the opposite has occurred.
The process is indeed so burdensome that very few programmatic
eagle take permits have been issued, and none have been issued
under the December 2013 amendments to those BGEPA permitting
rules. In fact, only one permit has been issued for a wind project . . . .
250. Phillip Taylor, Energy Policy: FWS Moves to Regulate Bird Kills from
Oil Wells, Power Lines, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (May 22, 2015),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060019062 (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. Supra Part II, subpart C and accompanying notes.
252. See Devon Energy Production Company, Comments on Incidental Take
of Migratory Birds—Programmatic Impact Statement (July 27, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0078&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“In its notice of intent for
the PEIS, the Service stated that it focuses its MBTA enforcement activities on
industries or activities that ‘chronically kill birds.’ Oil and gas operations do not,
however, chronically kill birds.”); National Association of Broadcasters,
Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters (July 27, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0084&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[T]he notice provides
virtually no factual basis to support a conclusion that broadcast towers have a
significant impact on migratory birds . . . . [T]he Notice’s assertions bout
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use its discretion to determine a “threshold for impact” to
determine when a permit is required, and what measures must
be taken to obtain one.253
Furthermore, it appears FWS is unsure of the ability to
regulate or the impact of the wind energy industry, so wind
hazards are not currently included as a hazard being considered,
despite recent wind energy prosecutions that would suggest FWS
recognizes wind energy as a hazard.254 The solar industry is
completely absent from this permitting consideration.255 The
combined effect of omitting solar and wind energy from
consideration, along with FWS’s claim to focus on sectors where
the impacts are well known, undermines FWS’s credibility
because it appears that FWS is choosing to favor enforcement
against some industries and not others.256 “FWS clearly
contemplates leaving at least some industrial sectors and
activities out of its permitting program and addressing their
impacts on migratory birds through the exercise of enforcement
discretion. The Notice does not indicate the criteria the agency
will use to draw this line.”257
Industries do not like to rely on prosecutorial discretion258—it
has become something of a “sword of Damocles,” with no one
communications towers’ impact on birds are contrary to directly relevant
evidence found in [a Federal Communications Commission final environmental
assessment].”); PCIA—The Wireless Infrastructure Association, In the Matter of
Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (July
27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQMB-2014-0067-0112&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[T]he FWS
lacks the factual underpinning necessary to support its proposed actions . . . .”).
253. Rodriguez, supra note 228.
254. The FWS has solicited comments addressing the feasibility of
permitting the wind energy sector. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. See
also supra notes 205–211 and accompanying text (discussing recent
prosecutions against wind energy developers for violations of the MBTA).
255. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20.
256. See Robert Bryce, Windmills vs. Birds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020478180457726711429483832
8 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (criticizing the presidential administrations for not
prosecuting wind energy projects that kill birds while vigorously pursuing
claims against fossil fuel projects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
257. Bell, supra note 22.
258. See THOMAS R. LUNDQUIST ET AL., CROWELL & MORING, THE MIGRATORY
BIRD TREATY ACT: AN OVERVIEW (2015), https://www.crowell.com/files/The-
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quite sure when or where it will fall next.259 The proposed
regulations simply do not alleviate that problem.
4. The Problem of Authority
The most significant problem with the proposed rulemaking
is that the FWS may not have the authority to regulate incidental
take in the first place.260 Clearly this is an unresolved question
given the disagreement in the courts, and FWS can not regulate
incidental take without the authority to do so given to them by
statute.
The issue essentially becomes, whose interpretation of the
MBTA is the more persuasive? This author asserts that the
answer is the limited interpretation. Using the canons of
statutory construction, it becomes clear that the MBTA, as it is
currently written, does not cover incidental take.

Migratory-Bird-Treaty-Act-An-Overview-Crowell-Moring.pdf
(“At
present,
persons, and companies conducting activities that do inadvertently cause
migratory bird deaths . . . . are subject to a crazy quilt of MBTA interpretations
that vary circuit-by-circuit . . . and dependent on the government’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. For many in the private sector, this legal uncertainty
and risk is unacceptable . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
259. McKinsey, supra note 71, at 75.
260. This issue has been raised by several of the comments submitted to the
Notice of Intent. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice
of Intent to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0114&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“We believe the weight of
judicial authority in the U.S. overwhelmingly runs counter to the FWS’s position
regarding authority over incidental take . . . .”); AES U.S. Services, Re:
Incidental Take of Migratory Birds (July 27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0077&attachment Number
=1&contentType=pdf (“AES does not agree with the Service that the MBTA take
prohibition was intended to apply to the incidental take of birds during
otherwise lawful industrial or commercial activity . . . .”); PCIA—The Wireless
Infrastructure Association, In the Matter of Migratory Bird Permits;
Programmatic
Environmental
Impact
Statement
(July
27,
2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/ contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-20140067-0112&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“As recognized by the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the MBTA
applies only to hunting and poaching activities and does not apply to lawful
commercial activity . . . .”).
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First, “when confronted with issues of statutory construction,
courts begin by examining the plain language of the statute.”261
To find the plain meaning of the statute, courts “look not only to
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute
as a whole and to is object and policy.”262 When a particular term
has not been defined in the statute, the court then looks to its
ordinary meaning, or meaning under common law.263
Take is not defined in the MBTA,264 so the term must be
construed according to its ordinary meaning or common law
meaning, unless the legislature has indicated that the term
does not retain its common law meaning for the purposes of
this statute. The ordinary meaning of the word take, in the
context of wildlife, us “to get into one’s hands or into one’s
possession, power, or control.”265 A further dictionary
definition is “to get possession of (as fish or game) by killing or
capturing.”266 The plain meaning of take, which was wellunderstood at the time the MBTA was passed,267 conveys that
take necessitates intentional action that results in taking
possession of wildlife. Incidental take is not such an action.268
The plain meaning of take thus supports a narrow
interpretation of the MBTA.269

Furthermore, a court must interpret a criminal statute
narrowly. “When choice has to be made between two readings of
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate,
261. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (D.N.
Dak. 2012).
262. Crandon v. United States 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
263. See United States v. Shahani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1995) (“[Courts] follow
the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications,
Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms.”).
264. See generally, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 (2012).
265. Take, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016).
266. Id.
267. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) (using the word take
as a term of art in the context of determining whether the right to reduce
animals to possession is one subject to lawmaking).
268. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 489 (5th Cir.
2015) (“One does not reduce an animal to human control accidentally or by
omission; he does so affirmatively.”).
269. This definition is further supported by the MBTA’s implementing
regulations. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2017) (“Take means to pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect.”).
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before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and
definite.”270 This serves an important constitutional purpose;
“because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity. This policy embodies ‘the
instinctive distastes against men languishing in prison unless the
lawmaker has clearly said they should.’”271 Thus, as a criminal
statute, the MBTA must be construed narrowly, absent a clear
direction from the legislature.
There is no such clear direction from the legislature in the
MBTA concerning whether the MBTA creates liability for
incidental take or not as is evident from the circuit split over
whether the statute encompasses incidental take: “[t]he current
law . . . is vague and ambiguous as it relates to sanctions for
lawful, commercial activity that may indirectly injure or kill
birds.”272 This ambiguity should be resolved in favor of a narrow
meaning, one that does not encompass incidental take, and one
which better comports with the strict liability nature of the
statute. Strict liability means that one can be convicted of
violating the MBTA without doing so knowingly or intentionally.
However, in order to be convicted, that person must still commit
the act voluntarily, or affirmatively.273 By its very definition,
incidental take is not an affirmative action. Including incidental
take in the scope of liability under MBTA is thus not consistent
with the strict liability nature of the statute.
A narrow interpretation is further supported by the context,
purpose, and legislative history of the MBTA. As discussed, the
MBTA was enacted to combat overhunting and poaching.274 This
270. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22
(1952).
271. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (further citations
omitted).
272. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212 (D. N.
Dak. 2012).
273. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir.
2015) (“[R]equiring defendants, as an element of an MBTA misdemeanor crime,
to take an affirmative action to cause migratory bird deaths is consistent with
the imposition of strict liability.”) (citing WAYNE LEFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e)
(5th ed. 2010)).
274. Supra notes 29–44 and accompanying text.
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is evident not only from the historical context of the Act, but also
its legislative history.275 The Senator who introduced the bill
stated that “this law is aimed at the professional pothunter,”276
while the opposition to the bill focused on its breadth and
potential to conflict with property rights.277 This debate
emphasizes the implausibility of an expansive meaning of the
statute: “In the wake of court decisions finding earlier laws
designed to regulate bird hunting unconstitutional, it seems
unlikely that Congress would have attempted a law so expansive
as to affect farming, timber harvesting, and window
installation.”278 This reading is supported by the repeated refusal
of Congress to expand the law. Congress had the opportunity to
clarify or extend the statute in 1960 when the “market hunter”
penalties were added, and in 1974 when the Act was amended to
include a prohibition on selling illicitly obtained bird parts.279
The 1974 amendment would have been an opportune time to
extend or clarify the MBTA, as it was undertaken only a year
after Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA).280 The
ESA definition of take includes “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, capture, or collect.”281 The ESA also explicitly
defines and prohibits incidental take.282 These definitions are
275. See 56 CONG. REC. 7357 (1918) (statement of Rep. Fess) (stating that
annual food losses caused by insects require protection of birds from “the market
hunter”); 56 CONG. REC. 7360 (1918) (statement of Rep. Anthony) (“[T]he people
who are against this bill are the market shooters, who want to go out and kill a
lot of birds in the spring, when they ought not to kill them, and some so-called
city sportsmen, who want spring shooting just to gratify a lust for slaughter.”);
56 CONG. REC. 7376 (1918) (statement of Rep. Kincheloe) (“If you want the
pothunters to disregard this solemn treaty we made with Canada and kill these
migratory birds and stop their propagation, then you want to vote against this
bill.”).
276. 55 CONG. REC. 4402 (statement of Sen. Smith). A pothunter is someone
who hunts merely to achieve a kill, rather than for sport.
277. See 55 CONG. REC. 4813 (July 9, 1917) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“[The
MBTA] proposes to turn ... powers over to the Secretary of Agriculture for the
creation of zones, to tell white men when and where they can hunt, to make it a
crime for a man to shoot game on his own farm . . . .”).
278. Means, supra note 12, at 831–32.
279. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1982).
280. Means, supra note 12, at 832–33.
281. 16 U.S.C. § 1532.
282. 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
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clear deviations from the common law meaning of the term take,
a sign that if Congress intended for the MBTA meaning of take to
deviate from the common law definition, they would have done so.
In conclusion, the evidence supports a narrow reading of the
MBTA. However, while the MBTA does not currently cover
incidental take, there is nothing preventing the legislature from
amending the MBTA to expand its reach.
V. The Need for a Legislative Solution
The MBTA has a legal problem—there is inconsistent and
unpredictable enforcement of a statute that has an enormous
impact on industry. This problem can be resolved judicially,
through regulations, or legislatively.283 The courts are divided,284
and unless the Supreme Court chooses to weigh in, do not have
the power to fix the problem nationwide because their decisions
are binding only in their jurisdictions. The agencies do not have
the authority to fix the problem, and by continuing to use
prosecutorial discretion to enforce the MBTA, may in fact be
contributing to the issue.285 FWS is attempting to bring more
certainty to the arena,286 but their chosen method is extremely
flawed. The best and only reasonable solution is for the
legislature to amend the MBTA.
This is a proposal that has been suggested previously,287 but
it takes on new urgency as these industries are growing and FWS
283. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 46–54 (discussing the possibility of
legislative, judicial, or regulatory changes that could reshape the legal
landscape of the MBTA).
284. See supra notes 99–167 (discussing various ways Courts have
interpreted the MBTA).
285. Supra notes 247–281 and accompanying text; see McKinsey, supra note
71, at 89 (arguing that the uncertainty brought on by reliance on selective
enforcement creates risks for industries).
286. See supra Part V, subpart A and accompanying notes (discussing FWS’s
proposal for incidental take permits).
287. See McKinsey, supra note 71, at 91 (suggesting that Congress create a
statutory MBTA take permit); Minikowski, supra note 95, at 157–58 (proposing
that Congress amend the MBTA to include a civil penalty provision and a
citizen suit provision); Obrecht, supra note 93, at 141–42 (advocating that
Congress should issue a mandate authorizing an incidental take permit
program); Ogden, supra note 10, at 46–48 (discussing the possibility of
legislative amendment to the MBTA, but noting that Congress is slow to act).
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is attempting to greatly expand their authority through
rulemaking.
First, Congress should amend the MBTA to make it clear
that the criminal provisions do not apply to incidental take. This
is consistent with the meaning of the statute, and will greatly
alleviate any legal uncertainty. Congress has amended the MBTA
before to exclude specific groups or activities from MBTA
liability,288 so it is not unreasonable for Congress to make this
type of amendment. The prior amendments to the MBTA
implicitly recognized that the blanket prohibition and criminal
penalties imposed by the Act are not an appropriate way to
protect migratory birds in every scenario, and that the Act must
adapt.289
Second, legislators should add a civil penalty provision to the
MBTA that specifically governs incidental take. In this provision
incidental take should be defined as it is in the ESA: “take that is
incidental to, but not the purpose of, otherwise lawful activity.” 290
A clear definition of incidental take is important to the success of
an amendment so that there is not potential ambiguity over
whether a violation falls under the criminal or the civil
provisions.291
The civil provisions should allow for the FWS to take civil
action against an actor that has had incidental take, but the
288. In 1972, Section 712 was added to the Act to allow the indigenous
people of the State of Alaska to take migratory birds and their eggs in order to
satisfy “nutritional and other essential needs, as determined by the Secretary of
the Interior.” 16 U.S.C. § 712 (2012). In 2002, the National Defense
Authorization Act, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002), authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to amend the MBTA to exempt the Armed Forces for incidental
take. Id. The final regulation declares that the MBTA “does not apply to the
incidental taking of a migratory bird by a member of the Armed Forces during a
military readiness activity authorized by the Secretary of Defense or the
Secretary of the military department concerned.” 50 C.F.R. § 21.15 (2017).
289. See Minikowski, supra note 95, at 168 (“The issue is that
environmental statutes—MBTA being a prime example—have the ability to
become frozen in the age in which they were enacted and not provide ways to
address modern environmental threats . . . .”).
290. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012).
291. For a more thorough discussion, see Minikowski, supra note 95, at 159–
60 (arguing that the MBTA needs to be amended to include a definition of take
that includes the qualifiers “harass” and “harm” so there is no doubt as to
whether take is incidental or not).
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provision should reduce or eliminate liability based on whether
the deaths were foreseeable, or if the violator had been following
established best practices for minimizing incidental take.
Incidental take would be therefore be allowed in specific
circumstances, subject to specific conditions—a type of
enforcement that FWS is familiar with, as is evidenced by the
conditions attached to hunting and the Duck Stamp Program.292
A civil penalty provision has several benefits. Foremost, civil
penalties resolve the issue of whether the statute is
unconstitutionally vague and the potential due process
concerns.293 Civil penalties would also alleviate corporation’s
fears of reputational harm that accompany criminal prosecutions,
although civil fines would encourage corporations to take
measures to prevent incidental take.294
Furthermore, civil penalties are more adapted to curing the
problems of reconciling concern for developing modern industry
and concern for conserving avian life. Criminal penalties serve to
“deter the criminal conduct at which it is aimed,” however, it is
not possible to deter the unintentional bird deaths that are
caused by incidental take.295 Civil penalties better serve the aims
of the MBTA because they “could include monetary fines, as well
as injunctive relief to cease the action or remedy the condition
causing the taking,” and could also help mitigate future taking.296
The monetary fines can then be channeled directly to the FWS for
use in conservation efforts. The FWS has successfully run the
Duck Stamp Program by using hunters to pay for conservation
efforts297—fines for incidental take can be channeled into
conservation in a similar fashion.

292. Supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
293. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 47 (discussing the benefits of civil
penalties in comparison to criminal penalties, which carry the possibility of
imprisonment and stigma in addition to fines).
294. See Minikowski, supra note 95, at 160–61 (“Though civil penalties
under MBTA would not be designed to expressly deter incidental takes, the
penalties would inadvertently do just that due to the strong economic incentive
that the possibility of such fines would create.”).
295. Id. at 160.
296. Ogden, supra note 10, at 47
297. Supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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Finally, civil penalties can be structured in a way that
removes some of the prosecutorial discretion of FWS. The civil
provisions should contain an element of foreseeability, and there
should be a reduction or elimination of liability if the violator has
followed FWS guidelines for mitigating incidental take. The
foreseeability requirement is essential; “a civil penalty provision
with a foreseeability requirement would operate most justly by
only fining those that realized incidental bird deaths were
possible, yet did nothing to reasonably prevent them from
happening.”298 This is also essential to prevent absurd results—
truly unforeseeable bird deaths should not become a basis for
liability.
Violators who have followed “best practices” for preventing
bird deaths should not be liable for incidental take. FWS can
issue industry-specific standards that detail the best practices in
each affected industry for minimizing bird deaths, and those
actors that adhere to those practices and are not negligent will
have reduced or no liability under the civil provisions. These best
practice guidelines should undergo notice and comment because
they will have the force of law, but also because it is important
for industry actors to weigh in on how best to mitigate bird
deaths. This solution may be slow, but it is possible—FWS has
issued voluntary guidelines to industry sectors, showing that they
are capable of creating such guidelines.299 While these guidelines
may necessarily have to be updated as industry changes, they
would provide a much higher level of legal certainty to those who
may have some incidental take than the current situation. Some
industries will almost necessarily have incidental take as a
consequence of their existence—the wind industry is an obvious
example. However, the solution to this problem is not to paralyze
those industries with an uncertain legal landscape, but to
delineate under what conditions these industries may operate.
This strategy would allow industry actors to determine the
298. Minikowski, supra note 95, at 161.
299. See Guidance Documents, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/management/project-assessment-tools-andguidance/guidance-documents.php (last updated Feb. 29, 2016) (last visited Feb.
27, 2017) (providing access to activity-specific guidance documents for
communications towers, electric utilities lines, oil and gas, and wind energy) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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legality of their actions prior to acting, and would thus
unencumber desirable development, while not sacrificing
migratory birds.
The civil penalties approach would be in accord with judicial
decisions on both sides of the circuit split. In the case of FMC,
FMC was likely negligent in not testing the water discharge and
ensuring that the chemical treatment was in fact working.300
Under the proposed civil penalties, FMC would still be found in
violation of the MBTA, but for negligence and failure to take
reasonable steps to mitigate bird deaths. In the cases of Seattle
Audubon and Newton, however, the impact of logging on
migratory birds was not only indirect, but not obviously
foreseeable.301 Thus, under the proposed civil provisions, the
actors would not be liable.
Civil provisions would greatly alleviate the problems with
the current legal landscape surrounding the MBTA. They would
create certainty where there currently is none.
VI. Conclusion
Whether they believe that the MBTA should be read broadly
or narrowly, or if they come from the energy sector, the Audubon
society, or the government, every commentator and academic
agrees on one thing: the MBTA must be revised. The century-old
statute is designed to combat overhunting and poaching; it is not
designed to deal with the problems facing bird populations today.
Moreover, it is clear that today’s MBTA is not structured to
properly protect bird populations in today’s industrial society.302
FWS is attempting to deal with this problem of enforcement and
legal predictability by promulgating rules that would allow
interested parties to get permits for incidental take. This is
problematic because the FWS does not have the authority under
the current MBTA to regulate incidental taking. This action will
300. Supra notes 99–104.
301. Supra notes 138–145.
302. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 1 (“The result [of applying the MBTA to
combat modern threats to birds] has been uneven enforcement . . . legal
uncertainty for potential violators, lack of compliance with voluntary guidelines,
and steady escalating bird deaths.”).
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inevitably be challenged, bringing many of the underlying
problems of the current legal landscape around the MBTA to the
forefront.
The solution to the problem of uncertainty around the
MBTA, its enforcement, and its interpretation cannot be
regulatory—most obviously because the MBTA does not confer on
the agencies the authority to do so.303 The most appropriate
solution to these problems is legislative.

303.

See supra Part IV, subpart B, section 4 and accompanying notes.

